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DRAFT: Crisis at the Pregnancy Center: Regulating 
Pseudo-Clinics and Reclaiming Informed Consent 
Teneille R. Brown† 
ABSTRACT: Crisis Pregnancy Centers (CPCs) adopt the look of medical 
practices—complete with workers in scrubs, ultrasound machines, and invasive 
physical exams—to deceive pregnant women into thinking they are being treated 
by licensed medical professionals. In reality, CPCs offer exclusively Bible-
based, non-objective counseling. Numerous attempts to regulate CPCs have 
faced political roadblocks. Most recently, in NIFLA v. Becerra, the Supreme 
Court held that state efforts to require CPCs to disclose that they are not 
medically licensed are unconstitutional violations of CPCs’ First Amendment 
right to free speech. In the wake of that decision, pregnant women in crisis—a 
disproportionate percentage of whom are low-income women, minority women, 
or women in vulnerable or dangerous situations—continue to be subject to 
CPCs’ ideological marketing, masquerading as medical advice. 
 
This Article employs tort law to offer a novel way to regulate CPCs’ deceptive 
practices. It proposes that women who submit to physical exams or ultrasounds 
under CPCs’ false pretenses could successfully raise a battery claim. The 
intimate touching of a woman would most certainly be considered objectively 
offensive, and while the woman might technically consent to the touching, this 
consent is meaningless if it is based on misrepresentations. Contrary to popular 
understanding, the touching need not be intentionally malicious or result in 
physical injury to the plaintiff. 
 
This Article makes two contributions to the literature. First, it provides a 
practicable, novel solution to an urgent and timely issue. By relying on private 
causes of action, this Article’s proposal sidesteps the collective action problems 
and political willpower obstacles that have long hampered larger-scale attempts 
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to regulate CPCs. It places the injured woman in the driver’s seat and allows her 
to be compensated for the dignitary harm imposed when CPCs use deception to 
gain access to her body. Second, this Article contributes to robust literatures in 
torts, informed consent, and medical ethics by reinforcing an increasingly blurry 
line between medicine and pseudo-medicine. Informed consent means 
something; it is not merely a vehicle through which ideology can be shoehorned. 
Where CPCs are not licensed, they should be sued for battery, which honors the 
individual’s dignity and is not deferential to an industry standard of care. 
Physicians should be allowed to have political voices. So, too, should pro-life 
activists. But each should have their policy debates, and win or lose them, in the 
political sphere. It does violence to the physician-patient relationship, and the 
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Crisis Pregnancy Centers (CPCs) are nonprofit agencies that purport to 
provide free services to women who are considering terminating their 
pregnancies. However, their “paramount, and typically undisclosed, mission is 
to convince women not to have abortions.”1 CPCs engage in deliberate efforts to 
mislead pregnant women.2 They hold themselves out as secular medical 
                                                            
 1.  Kathryn Gilbert, Commercial Speech in Crisis: Crisis Pregnancy Center Regulations and 
Definitions of Commercial Speech, 111 U. MI. L. REV. 592, 592 (2013). 
 2.  “False and misleading advertising by clinics that do not provide abortions, emergency 
contraception, or referrals to providers of such services has become a problem of national importance. 
This issue has been the subject of a congressional report and proposed federal legislation. . . . The 
congressional report found that certain pregnancy resource centers ‘frequently fail to provide medically 
accurate information’ and that ‘the vast majority of pregnancy centers’ contacted during the 
investigation misrepresented the medical consequences of abortion. The report further concluded that 
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providers, claiming in their advertising to counsel pregnant women on the full 
range of their reproductive options. CPCs buy Google ad-words like “abortion 
services”3 to direct people to their facilities. Their websites feature images of 
nurses wearing scrubs and standing in front of ultrasound equipment.4 When you 
visit the CPC, its lobby resembles that of a health clinic.5 CPCs have names like 
“Obria Medical Clinics” or the “Bakersfield Pregnancy Center.”6 The exam 
rooms resemble those of doctors’ offices. Before you see a volunteer, you are 
asked to fill out paperwork, channeling the procedure you would experience 
before seeing a doctor. To complete the presentation that this is a medical 
facility, some CPCs even refer to those who seek their services as “patients.”7 
Given this quite deliberate staging, one would be forgiven for thinking that 
CPCs are ordinary medical clinics. However, CPCs have a different purpose, 
which is primarily to counsel against abortion.8 They are different in terms of the 
                                                            
while ‘[t]his tactic may be effective in frightening pregnant teenagers and women and discouraging 
abortion [,]’ it ‘denies [them] vital health information, prevents them from making an informed decision, 
and is not an accepted public health practice.’” See First Resort, Inc. v. Herrera, 860 F.3d 1263, 1268 
(9th Cir. 2017). See also B. Jessie Hill, Casey Meets the Crisis Pregnancy Centers, 43 J.L. MED. & 
ETHICS 59, 64 (2015) (“Numerous reports have indicated that some CPCs use deceptive tactics to 
dissuade women from choosing abortion, such as providing false information about the risks and effects 
of abortion, providing false information about the law and availability of abortion, and telling women 
that their pregnancies are more advanced than they really are.”). 
 3.  Press Release, NARAL PRO-CHOICE AMERICA, In Response to NARAL Pro-Choice America, 
Google Removes Deceptive Anti-Choice Ads from Search Engine (Apr. 28, 2014), 
http://www.prochoiceamerica.org/media/press-releases/2014/pr04282014_google_cpc.html 
[https://perma.cc/WB8H-9E5L] (last visited Nov. 19, 2018). See also Press Release, NARAL PRO-
CHOICE AMERICA, 66,608 Americans Call on Yellowpages.com and Superpages.com to Stop Allowing 
Deceptive Anti-Abortion Ads (July 6, 2010), 
http://www.commondreams.org/newswire/2010/07/07/66608-americans-call-yellowpagescom-and-
superpagescom-stop-allowing-deceptive [https://perma.cc/WRU3-LXAH] (last visited Nov. 19, 2018). 
 4.  “Well, they are advertising themselves. I looked at one -- a few of them. An exemplary of this is 
the Fallbrook Pregnancy Resource Center website. And it’s -- I’m fairly sophisticated -- there is a 
woman on the home page with a uniform that looks like a nurse’s uniform in front of an ultrasound 
machine. It shows an exam room. The text of the page titled ‘Abortion’ says Fallbrook will educate 
clients about different abortion methods available, and describe in medical terms different abortion 
procedures. The website also says clients will be evaluated by nurses and that they follow all HIPAA 
regulations, which if they’re not a medical provider, they don’t have to follow If a reasonable person 
could look at this website and think that you’re giving medical advice, would the unlicensed notice be 
wrong?” Oral Argument at 13:33, Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 
(2018) (No. 16-1140), https://www.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-1140 [https://perma.cc/4HRK-9JQQ]. 
 5.  Alice X. Chen, Crisis Pregnancy Centers: Impeding the Right to Informed Decision Making, 19 
CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 933, 934 (2013) 
 6.  See OBRIA MEDICAL CLINICS OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, https://omcsocal.org/ 
[https://perma.cc/4G86-RT5W] (last visited Dec. 25, 2018); BAKERSFIELD PREGNANCY CENTER, 
http://www.bpcpartners.org/ [https://perma.cc/9W7X-UC9C] (last visited Dec. 25, 2018). 
 7.  “[Alternatives Women’s Center] refers to those who seek its services as ‘patients.’” A Woman’s 
Friend Pregnancy Res. Clinic v. Harris, 153 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1187 (E.D. Cal. 2015), aff’d, 669 F. 
App’x 495 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 8.  Danielle Lang, Truthful but Misleading? The Precarious Balance of Autonomy and State 
Interests in Casey and Second-Generation Doctor-Patient Regulation, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1353, 
1390 (2014). 
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training and licensure their staff is required to receive, which is usually none.9 
They are different in terms of the privacy and safety standards that are imposed 
upon them by law, which are few.10 As of June 2018, they are different in terms 
of the First Amendment protection they are afforded, which is considerably more 
than that afforded to medical clinics. And, because of all of this, they are different 
in terms of their lack of accountability when they injure women. Actual medical 
clinics have safety, training, and compelled disclosure requirements that do not 
apply to pseudo-clinics like CPCs. 
CPCs are typically funded by Christian organizations as well as state and 
local governments.11 In some cases, CPCs are subsidized by federal block grants 
that were developed to aid poor families.12 The counseling CPCs provide is 
exclusively pro-life and “Bible-based.”13 Many CPC volunteers see their job as 
a religious ministry or calling to do whatever is necessary to convince women to 
carry their pregnancy to term.14 
There have been several investigations of CPCs—some from the ivory halls 
of Congress and some from the glossy pages of Cosmopolitan magazine—
revealing widespread deceptive CPC practices. In one instance, after asking a 
pregnant woman to submit urine for a pregnancy test, the staff then spent 45 
minutes going over Bible verses, adoption options, and inaccurate descriptions 
                                                            
 9.  Most CPCs are unlicensed facilities and are staffed by volunteers who are not licensed medical 
professionals. Beth Holtzman, Have Crisis Pregnancy Centers Finally Met Their Match: California’s 
Reproductive Fact Act, 12 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 78, 83 (2017). 
 10.  Given that CPCs are not considered professional medical providers, they would not be 
subjected to medical malpractice, and held to a professional standard of care, for their negligence. 
Instead they would be held to the lower, “ordinary” negligence standard. Additionally, the many state 
and local safety ordinances that apply to health clinics—that regulate facilities, licensure, and staffing—
do not apply to CPCs. Finally, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act requires that 
health care providers receive authorization before sharing protected health information with a non-
covered entity. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.500 (West 2018). Given that CPCs are not “covered entities,” the 
privacy protections HIPAA affords would not protect pregnant women who visit CPCs, unless the CPC 
voluntarily complies with HIPAA (which could not be enforced by the U.S. government). 
 11.  “[Real Alternatives, a CPC, has] advised Florida, Minnesota, Nebraska, and North Dakota in 
establishing state-financed anti-abortion centers, and it helped establish Texas’s multimillion-dollar 
program, which runs on the same model [as Pennsylvania’s]. In 2014, Real Alternatives won a no-bid 
contract to operate Michigan’s burgeoning program.” Meaghan Winter, What Some Pregnancy Centers 
Are Really Saying to Women with Unplanned Pregnancies, COSMOPOLITAN (July 14, 2015), 
http://www.cosmopolitan.com/politics/news/a43101/pregnancy-centers-august-2015/ 
[https://perma.cc/8Q5T-XG7S] (last visited Nov. 19, 2018). 
 12.  ThinkProgress issued a report in 2016 that revealed that many CPCs are funded, in part, 
through state welfare programs. See Bryce Covert & Josh Israel, The States that Siphon Welfare Money 
to Stop Abortion, THINKPROGRESS (Oct. 3, 2016), https://thinkprogress.org/tanf-cpcs-
ec002305dd18/#.jllccm8ij [https://perma.cc/GU2R-J6RE] (last visited Nov. 19, 2018). 
 13.  See, e.g., THE AM. ASS’N OF CHRISTIAN COUNSELORS, https://www.aacc.net 
[https://perma.cc/BUF3-TWE8] (last visited Nov. 7, 2018). See also Callie Beusman, How Anti-
Abortion Zealots Pose as Medical Professionals to Trick Pregnant Women, BROADLY (May 30, 2017), 
https://broadly.vice.com/en_us/article/pae9ak/how-anti-abortion-zealots-pose-as-medical-professionals-
to-trick-pregnant-women [https://perma.cc/6DVR-2LUG] (last visited Nov. 19, 2018). 
 14.  See, e.g., PRESBYTERIANS PRO-LIFE (PPL), http://www.ppl.org/index.php/ministry-
equipping/ministry-development/crisis-pregnancy-ministry [https://perma.cc/3BDN-Y7HZ] (last visited 
Nov. 19, 2018). 
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of the embryo’s development in ways that would humanize the fetus. The 
pregnant woman recounted how “[t]he nurse really, really slowed down during 
the fetal pain part. She said, ‘[h]ere are the fingertips. The baby feels everything 
you’re feeling . . . .”15 During the sonogram, the nurse said the images were not 
clear and she needed to do a transvaginal ultrasound. According to the woman, 
the nurse “didn’t explain anything or say, ‘We’re going to stick this cone inside 
you.’”16 
In another instance, a Manhattan CPC kept delaying the return of a pregnant 
woman’s laboratory results. The CPC insisted she return week after week for 
various and vague reasons. When this woman became agitated about the delays, 
she was incorrectly told “not to worry because she could get an abortion in New 
York at any time.”17 She eventually went to an obstetrician in severe distress, 
seeking a late-term abortion that was no longer legal and no longer possible. She 
sobbed with her obstetrician, who felt powerless to help her. 
While these instances may constitute fraud, in many cases the counseling 
takes on a subtler form of deception. Staff are instructed to use fear tactics and 
to provide medically unsound information, such as claiming that undergoing an 
abortion heightens the risk of breast cancer or decreases a woman’s fertility.18 In 
some states, legislatures have cooperated with pro-life organizations to create 
mandatory disclosure “informed consent” laws that require physicians, but not 
CPCs, to provide clinically inaccurate information19 (such as the above comment 
that in the first trimester “the baby feels everything you’re feeling.”). These 
informed consent statutes have been referred to as targeted regulation of abortion 
providers, or “TRAP” laws. 
                                                            
 15.  There is no evidence that a 6-8 week fetus can feel pain.  María J. Mayorga-Buiza, 
Letter to the Editor, Can fetus feel pain in the second trimester? Lessons learned from a sentinel event, 
34 CHILD NERVOUS SYSTEM, 195, 195 (2018). Even so, CPCs share this inaccurate information with 
pregnant women. Winter, supra note 11. 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Dr. Anne Davis, MD, Remarks at Medical and Legal Aspects of Targeted Regulation of 
Abortion Providers (TRAP) Laws Symposium (Dec. 1, 2017), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=leH4_ODKoLA [https://perma.cc/5X64-5AQC] (last visited Nov. 
19, 2018) (Speaking about a patient she saw in New York, who was repeatedly told that she could “get 
an abortion at any time in New York, and to keep coming back to the CPC.”). 
 18.  “[One study found] that approximately 87% of the centers contacted provided false or 
misleading information about the health effects of an abortion, including information about a link 
between abortion and breast cancer, the effect of abortion on future fertility, and the mental health 
effects of abortion. The second report cited was a January 2008 report by the NARAL Pro–Choice 
Maryland Fund. NARAL sent volunteers into [CPCs] in Maryland, including Centro Tepeyac, and 
found that every center visited provided false or misleading information, including ‘false information 
about abortion risks, misleading data on birth control, and emotionally manipulative counseling.’” 
Tepeyac v. Montgomery Cty., 5 F. Supp. 3d 745, 749 (D. Md. 2014). 
 19.  See generally Lois Shepherd and Hilary Turner, The Over-Medicalization and Corrupted 
Medicalization of Abortion and its Effect on Women Living in Poverty, 46 J. LAW MED. & ETHICS 672 
(2018); see also Michele Goodwin, The Pregnancy Penalty, 26 HEALTH MATRIX 17, 19 (2016). 
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Informed consent TRAP laws have been largely upheld as constitutional 
regulations on professional speech. One of the key issues that this Article will 
address is the disparate treatment of licensed and unlicensed medical providers 
in the context of abortion. While physicians can be compelled to provide 
medically inaccurate or misleading information to patients because they are 
professionals, CPCs cannot be so compelled, because they are not professionals. 
This paradoxical treatment leaves pregnant women vulnerable to harm and 
obscures the distinction between medicine and pseudo-medicine. 
To be sure, not every woman is tricked by CPC tactics.20 At some point, a 
sophisticated woman may realize the advice she is receiving is peculiar: it is not 
balanced, secular, or objective, as it should be.21 She might then conclude that 
this “clinic” is really an elaborate theatrical set for deception. However, because 
CPCs target under-insured, under-educated, and low-income women,22 they 
often encounter women who are not as equipped to ferret out the pseudo-clinical 
from the clinical. Indeed, low-income women of color might be particularly used 
to the public social judgment that has come with many of their life “choices.”23 
These women unfortunately may be accustomed to receiving patronizing and 
directive counseling from someone who should be unbiased and neutral. It makes 
sense then, that undercover investigations have documented that many pregnant 
women who visit CPCs actually think that the advice they are receiving is 
medical and measured against an industry standard of care. 
The consequences of this misinformation for the pregnant woman’s health 
are astronomical, as the CPC postpones necessary clinical treatment. Treatment 
during pregnancy is extremely time-sensitive, and “[p]rompt obstetric 
interventions are crucial to prevent intrapartum- related fetal hypoxic injury and 
maternal morbidity and mortality associated with obstetric emergencies.”24 
                                                            
 20.  “This is B.S., Nicole kept thinking, but you’re trying to make me think it’s true . . . . Some 
women arrive at those centers in search of Christian counseling or free diapers, but the vast majority are 
looking for professional advice to help them navigate unplanned pregnancies.” Winter, supra note 11. 
(italics in original). 
 21. See, Thomas R. McCormick, D.Min., Spirituality in Medicine,  Ethics in Medicine 
University of Washington School of Medicine, available online at 
https://depts.washington.edu/bioethx/topics/spirit.html ; (“Professional ethics requires physicians to not 
impinge their beliefs on patients who are particularly vulnerable when seeking health care. .  
 22.  “CPCs specifically target low-income communities, minority populations, and places with 
young, vulnerable women, like high schools and colleges.” Brittany A. Campbell, The Crisis Inside 
Crisis Pregnancy Centers: How to Stop These Facilities from Depriving Women of Their Reproductive 
Freedom, 37 B.C.J.L. & SOC. JUST. 73, 76 (2017). See also N. 19 46 J. LAW MED & ETHICS 672, 677. . 
 23.  “[P]oor women’s private lives are made available for state surveillance and problematization . . 
. private information about women’s health and economic statuses is gathered and recorded. Their diets 
are quantified and censured. Their histories with substance abuse, sexual abuse, public assistance, and 
any form of contact with the state are considered significant and relevant. In essence, a poor, pregnant 
woman’s privacy interest—that is, her interest in preventing the government from intruding into her 
personal, intimate affairs—has been violated.” Khiara M. Bridges, Poor Women and the Protective 
State, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 1619, 1622–23 (2012). 
 24.  G. Justus Hofmeyr et al., Obstetric Care in Low-Resource Settings: What, Who, and How to 
Overcome Challenges to Scale Up?, 107 INTL. J. GYN. & OBSTET. S21, S21 (2009). 
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Pregnant women can have significant health risks that, if undetected, can lead to 
the death of the woman, the fetus, or both.25 Of course, receiving pseudo-clinical 
care also jeopardizes a woman’s trust and confidence in the larger health care 
establishment, as the clinic is no longer exclusively a place for objective health 
information. This can negatively affect her relationship with medical providers 
for the rest of her life. 
The explosion of CPCs has been attributed to Birthright International, a CPC 
network organization that was founded in 1968 and has over 400 chapters on 
three continents.26 Most CPCs in the United States are linked with an umbrella 
organization such as Birthright, Care Net, Heartbeat International, or the 
National Institute of Family and Life Advocates (“NIFLA”). These umbrella 
organizations are Christian and provide leadership and support to thousands of 
CPCs. NIFLA, for example, states on its website that it is a  
 
Christian ministry that seeks to glorify God by proclaiming the sanctity of 
human life, both born and unborn. Through the provision of legal resources 
and counsel to charitable faith-based Pregnancy Resource Centers (PRCs) 
and Pregnancy Medical Clinics (PMCs), NIFLA seeks to develop a network 
of life-affirming ministries in every community across the nation.27  
 
While these websites eventually disclose the religious mission of the CPCs, in-
person visits often do not provide the same transparent disclosure. 
There are thousands of CPCs in the United States.28 This is a national, large-
scale campaign. Heartbeat International, a Christian organization that started out 
as a telephone hotline and developed into a system of CPCs, currently “serves 
1,800 affiliated pregnancy help locations, maternity homes, and non-profit 
adoption agencies on all 6 inhabited continents.”29 In the United States, CPCs 
                                                            
 25.  Andrew Healy et al., Early Access to Prenatal Care: Implications for Racial Disparity in 
Perinatal Mortality, 107 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 625, 625 (2006) (“The establishment of 
regularly scheduled medical visits for pregnant women represents one of the most important advances in 
obstetric care in the past century, and its role in reducing fetal death is well established.”). See also 
Pregnancy and Prenatal Care, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Sept. 15, 2017), 
https://www.cdc.gov/healthcommunication/toolstemplates/entertainmented/tips/PregnancyPrenatalCare.
html [https://perma.cc/2DCL-XXN9] (last visited Nov. 19, 2018) (“Each year, reports of approximately 
500 women who died as a result of a pregnancy-related complication are received by the Division of 
Reproductive Health at CDC. There are probably up to 500 additional such deaths that are not identified 
as being caused by pregnancy.”). 
 26.  See Discover Birthright, BIRTHRIGHT INT’L, http://birthright.org/learn/ [https://perma.cc/5447-
NVCP] (last visited Nov. 19, 2018). See also Chen, supra note 5, at 935-36. 
 27.  About NIFLA, NIFLA, https://nifla.org/about-nifla/ [https://perma.cc/JUG5-6TM3] (last visited 
Nov. 19, 2018). 
 28.  Laura Bassett, What Are ‘Crisis Pregnancy Centers,’ And Why Does The Supreme Court Care 
About Them?, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 13, 2017), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/crisis-
pregancy-centers-supreme-court_us_5a09f40ae4b0bc648a0d13a2 [https://perma.cc/4ZZZ-QNM3]. 
 29.  Our Story, HEARTBEAT INT’L, https://www.heartbeatinternational.org/about/our-story 
[https://perma.cc/J5K6-3UX2] (last visited Nov. 19, 2018). 
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now outnumber abortion clinics 3-to-1, though this number is likely an under-
estimate.30 In some states, the ratio is more like 10-to-1.31 
While the stated missions of these organizations appear charitable, and 
women benefit from the CPCs’ provision of free diapers or pregnancy tests, their 
practices are quite deceptive. Film documentaries, non-profit investigations, 
investigative journalism, and a 2006 Congressional report, commissioned by 
Senator Waxman (the “Waxman Report”),32 have demonstrated that the aim of 
CPCs is to lure vulnerable, under-insured or uninsured women away from 
abortion clinics.33 Given the ideological importance of their mission, CPC staff 
openly endorse misleading women if it means that fewer abortions will be 
performed.34 The success of CPCs is measured and marketed in terms of how 
many women they can persuade to carry their pregnancies to term. 
To further confuse pregnant women, CPCs are typically located just a few 
blocks from clinics that do counsel on and provide abortions.35 Some CPCs have 
bought the exact real estate where Planned Parenthoods were located after 
aggressive TRAP laws forced the Planned Parenthood clinics to close their 
doors.36 However, unlike the Planned Parenthood clinics, which are licensed and 
                                                            
 30.  Jenny Kutner, How Crisis Pregnancy Centers are Using Taxpayer Dollars to Lie to Women, 
SALON (July 14, 2015), 
https://www.salon.com/2015/07/14/how_crisis_pregnancy_centers_are_using_taxpayer_dollars_to_lie_t
o_women/ [https://perma.cc/6ZQD-4X7A] (last visited Nov. 19, 2018). This number is difficult to 
confirm, given that many CPCs operate without a license. The number of CPCs is likely even higher in 
many states. 
 31.  Teddy Wilson, ‘Completely Intentional’: Fake Clinics Outnumber Abortion Providers 10 to 1 
in Texas, REWIRE.NEWS (May 24, 2018), https://rewire.news/article/2018/05/24/completely-intentional-
fake-clinics-outnumber-abortion-providers-10-1-texas/ [https://perma.cc/J3EG-2W9B] (last visited Nov. 
19, 2018). 
 32.  See MINORITY STAFF OF H. COMM. ON GOV. REFORM, FALSE AND MISLEADING HEALTH 
INFORMATION PROVIDED BY FEDERALLY FUNDED PREGNANCY RESOURCE CENTERS 6 (July 2006) 
(prepared for Rep. Henry A. Waxman). At the Congressman’s request, the Special Investigations 
Division evaluated twenty-three CPCs through anonymous telephone interviews and also reviewed 
website tactics and advertising methods. 
 33.  Unmasking Fake Clinics: An Investigation into California’s Crisis Pregnancy Centers, 
NARAL PRO-CHOICE CALIFORNIA FOUND., www.prochoiceamerica.org/assets/download-files/cpc-
report-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/G578-KQN8] (last visited Nov. 19, 2018). 
 34.  “If you don’t hook her right away, she hangs up on you. When she calls and she says ‘Do you 
do abortions?’ I say ‘Are you calling for yourself or are you calling for your friend?’...and we engage in 
conversation. Because if she calls and says ‘Do you do abortions?’ and I say ‘No,’ click. [The CPC 
director pantomimes hanging up the phone]. I’m trying to get her in the door. Take control of the 
conversation . . . I don’t mind the criticisms of taking control. ‘That doesn’t sound fair.’ Well too bad!” 
12TH & DELAWARE (Home Box Office 2010). See also JACKSON (Girl Friday Films 2016). 
 35.  In another scene from 12th and Delaware, a CPC director conducts a training for volunteers in 
which she emphasizes the value of proximity to a clinic that provides abortions. She tells volunteers: 
“Clearly our competition is the abortion clinic. We are actually on opposite sides of the street . . . . 
They’re not always sure who they’re calling anyway.” 12TH & DELAWARE (Home Box Office 2010). See 
also Holtzman, supra note 9, at 86. 
 36.  These laws impose stringent requirements on abortion clinics that dictate such things as the 
width of hallways, lighting requirements, square footage requirements for exam space, admitting 
privileges for physicians at area hospitals, etc. Many clinics have had to close in the wake of these laws, 
which was the intended effect. See Caitlin E. Borgmann, Borrowing from Dormant Commerce Clause 
Doctrine in Analyzing Abortion Clinic Regulations, 26 HEALTH MATRIX 41, 45 (2016); see also Rachel 
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thoroughly regulated as medical clinics, CPCs are often not so licensed. 
Recognizing that many states could close the CPCs under statutes that require 
health facilities and their staff to be licensed, NIFLA has assisted over 700 CPCs 
in their conversion into licensed medical clinics.37 These conversions are a step 
in the right direction, as additional safeguards come from the CPCs being 
licensed. However, licensure has not completely halted the deceptive practices 
of CPCs. And, while many of the women who obtain services from CPCs assume 
they are getting treated by health care professionals who are subject to all that 
comes with that perception, the CPCs that remain unlicensed are not subjected 
to the numerous health, safety, and privacy regulations that attend to the regular 
practice of medicine.38 There is a great mismatch between the way CPCs present 
themselves to the public and the way they have presented themselves to the 
courts. 
This Article will proceed in four parts. The first section will discuss how 
legislators have attempted to thwart deceptive CPC practices through mandatory 
disclosure laws, and how these statutes have been successfully challenged on 
First Amendment grounds. While state consumer protection statutes provide 
fantastic avenues for correcting CPCs’ deception, they have been bafflingly 
underutilized due to political pressure in conservative states. Local prosecutors 
are not motivated to bring these consumer protection lawsuits against CPCs. 
Therefore, the second section makes the primary argument for a private remedy 
in tort law. Rather than rely on under-enforced or constitutionally vulnerable 
consumer protection regulation, this Article advocates for the use of the private, 
intentional tort of battery to provide redress for the women who have been 
physically touched by the CPCs’ and injured by their deceptive practices. There 
are many advantages to this approach, which puts many injured women in the 
driver’s seat, offers them money damages, and does not require legislative or 
political cooperation. In sections three and four, this Article discusses how states 
could, but do not, prosecute CPCs for the unlawful practice of medicine without 
a license, or for the use of FDA-approved devices in unapproved ways. Again, 
due to the lack of political will to enforce these options, they are not likely to 
provide an adequate remedy to most American women. The Article then 
concludes with some forward-looking concerns about the ways that medical 
informed consent has been hijacked by the pro-life movement. Contrasting how 
the First Amendment protects CPCs’ deceptive speech but is quite limited in its 
protection of the free speech rights of licensed medical providers, the Article 
                                                            
Suppé, A Right in Theory but Not in Practice: Voter Discrimination and Trap Laws As Barriers to 
Exercising A Constitutional Right, 23 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 107, 130 (2014). Following 
Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016), many of these TRAP laws might be 
struck down, but much damage in terms of patient access has already been done. 
 37.  Chen, supra note 5, at 935–36. 
 38.  In order to avoid state fines for the unauthorized practice of medicine, some CPCs have begun 
requiring that their nurses and medical directors maintain active medical licenses. 
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explores some concepts rooted in medical ethics. Namely, this Article 
acknowledges and articulates a worrying trend in reproductive jurisprudence 
which blurs the medical with the ideological, shoehorning politics through the 
mouths of licensed medical providers and doing violence to the physician-patient 
relationship.  
I. REGULATING CPCS THROUGH LEGISLATIVELY-COMPELLED DISCLOSURES 
A. Legislators Pass Disclosure Requirements to Curb the Documented, 
 Deceptive Practices of CPCs 
City and county legislators were understandably upset when the Waxman 
Report and other local investigations revealed the extent to which pregnant 
women were being misled by CPCs.39 Many cities and counties have passed 
ordinances attempting to curb the deception of CPCs through mandatory 
disclosure requirements.40 Typically, these ordinances required notices to be 
placed in the CPC waiting rooms indicating that the clinic is not licensed, or 
(more constitutionally infirm) stating that the CPC does not refer anyone to 
abortion services.41 These types of disclosure requirements have been struck 
down by the Fourth Circuit and, most recently, by the Supreme Court, for 
requiring speech that is not narrowly tailored or necessary to fulfill a compelling 
                                                            
 39.  Investigations in California, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, New York, North Carolina, 
Texas, and Virginia all have documented CPCs’ intentionally misleading practices. NARAL PRO-
CHOICE CAL. FOUND., UNMASKING FAKE CLINICS: THE TRUTH ABOUT CRISIS PREGNANCY CENTERS IN 
CALIFORNIA (2010), https://www.sfcityattorney.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Unmasking-Fake-
Clinics-The-Truth-About-Crisis-Pregnancy-Centers-in-California-.pdf [https://perma.cc/GZ2X-PNHQ] 
(last visited Dec. 25, 2018); NARAL PRO-CHOICE MD. FUND, MARYLAND CRISIS PREGNANCY CENTER 
INVESTIGATIONS: THE TRUTH REVEALED (2008), https://maryland.prochoiceamericaaffiliates.org/wp-
content/uploads/sites/11/2018/04/crisispregnancycenterreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/86M9-WRKX] (last 
visited Nov. 19, 2018); NARAL PRO-CHOICE MASS. & PRO-CHOICE MASS. FOUND., JUST BECAUSE 
YOU’RE PREGNANT . . . LIES, HALF TRUTHS, AND MANIPULATION AT CRISIS PREGNANCY CENTERS IN 
MASSACHUSETTS (2011); NARAL PRO-CHOICE N.Y. FOUND. & NAT’L INST. FOR REPROD. HEALTH, 
“SHE SAID ABORTION COULD CAUSE BREAST CANCER”: A REPORT ON THE LIES, MANIPULATIONS, AND 
PRIVACY VIOLATIONS OF CRISIS PREGNANCY CENTERS IN NEW YORK CITY (2010), 
https://www.nirhealth.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/cpcreport2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/6RMJ-
5TTN] (last visited Nov. 19, 2018); NARAL PRO-CHOICE N.C. FOUND., THE TRUTH REVEALED: 
NORTH CAROLINA’S CRISIS PREGNANCY CENTERS (2011), http://pulse.ncpolicywatch.org/wp-
content/uploads/2011/10/2011NARAL_CPCReport_V05_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/RCD6-Z96F] (last 
visited Nov. 19, 2018); NARAL PRO-CHOICE TEX. FOUND., THE TEXAS “ALTERNATIVES TO 
ABORTION” PROGRAM: BAD HEALTH POLICY, BAD FISCAL POLICY (2011), 
http://www.austintexas.gov/edims/document.cfm?id=163224 [https://perma.cc/3QS8-D8EY] (last 
visited Nov. 19, 2018): NARAL PRO-CHOICE VA., CRISIS PREGNANCY CENTERS REVEALED, PART II: 
AN INVESTIGATIVE UPDATE ON VIRGINIA CRISIS PREGNANCY CENTERS (2013); Press Release, NARAL 
Pro-Choice Mo. Found., Show Me Truth: NARAL Pro-Choice Missouri Organizes a Community Protest 
Against Deceptive Health Practices at ThriVe St. Louis (Feb. 11, 2012) (on file with author). 
 40.  Brittany A. Campbell, The Crisis Inside Crisis Pregnancy Centers: How to Stop These 
Facilities from Depriving Women of Their Reproductive Freedom, 37 B.C.J.L. & SOC. JUST. 73, 84 
(2017). 
 41.  Id. 
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state interest.42 Given how much the recent Supreme Court opinion, NIFLA v. 
Becerra, limits future restrictions on CPCs’ speech, it will be discussed in some 
detail below. 
B. CPCs Challenge Disclosures as Violations of Free Speech 
The First Amendment, applicable to the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment, prohibits the enactment of laws “abridging the freedom of 
speech.”43 Consequently, government has “no power to restrict expression 
because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”44 Laws that 
require speakers to communicate a particular message (“content-based” laws) 
“are presumptively unconstitutional and may be justified only if the government 
proves that they are narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests.”45 
However, the Court has held that this does not apply when the government seeks 
to regulate the commercial or professional speech of participants in the public 
marketplace.46 In the past, the Supreme Court “has been wary of claims that 
regulation of business activity, particularly health-related activity, violates the 
Constitution.”47 The key question for regulating CPCs under the First 
Amendment, therefore, is whether the CPC’s speech is ideological, commercial, 
or professional. 
An ordinance passed by Baltimore’s city council required CPCs to disclose 
that “the center does not provide or make referral for abortion or birth-control 
services,” and the disclosure must be “written in English and Spanish,” “easily 
readable,” and “conspicuously posted in the center’s waiting room or other area 
where individuals await service.”48 This was thus a content-based regulation, and 
if the speaker were ideological, as opposed to commercial or professional, the 
ordinance would need to satisfy strict scrutiny. A Baltimore CPC and the 
Catholic archbishop of Baltimore challenged this disclosure requirement as 
violating their free speech. A federal court in Maryland enjoined enforcement of 
the ordinance after the Fourth Circuit remanded, demanding greater discovery.49 
                                                            
 42.  Holtzman, supra note 9, at 79. 
 43.  U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 44.  Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972). 
 45.  Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz., 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015). 
 46.  More will be said infra, at Section I.B.3 about the application of the Zauderer precedent to 
CPCs speech. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 
650–53 (1985). 
 47.  See Nat’l Inst. Of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2381 (2018) (Breyer, 
J., dissenting). 
 48.  Greater Baltimore Ctr. For Pregnancy Concerns, Inc. v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 
721 F.3d 264, 271 (4th Cir. 2013). 
 49.  The district court’s hasty decision cannot be excused by its ruling that any commercial speech 
regulated by the Ordinance ‘is inextricably intertwined with otherwise fully protected speech,’ thus 
triggering strict scrutiny. Id. at 287. 
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Baltimore County appealed this decision, but the appellate court has not yet ruled 
on the matter. 
In Centro Tepeyac v. Montgomery County, a CPC challenged the Maryland 
county’s requirement that CPCs warn women that “the Center does not have a 
licensed medical professional on staff” and “the Montgomery County Health 
Officer encourages women who are or may be pregnant to consult with a licensed 
health care provider.”50 Despite acknowledging that “context matters” and courts 
must look to “the effect of the compelled statement [on the listener],”51 the 
district court emphasized that the speech that was being regulated occurred not 
on websites or through advertising, but in the CPC’s waiting room, and “within 
Centro Tepeyac’s four walls, much closer to their ideological message.”52 They 
then struck down the ordinances as violating the CPC’s free speech rights. The 
Fourth Circuit found that, as content-based compelled speech, the county 
ordinance failed to pass strict scrutiny.53 
California’s Reproductive FACT Act (“the FACT Act”)54 fared better in the 
lower federal courts, in part because it technically applied to all non-profit 
community clinics offering pregnancy counseling offices, rather than just those 
that are unlicensed or pro-life.55 In addition, the statute did not include any 
language about the state’s preference regarding where women received their 
pregnancy care, or that they were encouraged to see a licensed provider.56 The 
stated aims were clearer as well: to make sure California women were apprised 
of state-funded reproductive services in a timely fashion, and were made aware 
of how to access them.57 The legislative findings acknowledged that “pregnancy 
                                                            
 50.  5 F. Supp. 3d 745, 748 (D. Md. 2014). 
 51.  Id. at 758. 
 52.  Id. at 760. 
 53.  683 F.3d 591, 594 (4th Cir. 2012), on reh’g en banc sub nom. Centro Tepeyac v. Montgomery 
Cty., 722 F.3d 184 (4th Cir. 2013). 
 54.  CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 123470-123473 (Deering 2018). 
 55.  The Act did have exemptions for certain facilities, which may have proved fatal to the Act. The 
first exemption was for clinics operated by a federal agency, and was included so the Act was not 
federally pre-empted. The second exemption was for clinics that participated in California’s “Family 
Planning, Access, Care, and Treatment Program” (Family PACT program). Id. § 123471(c). To 
participate in the Family PACT program, a clinic must provide “the full scope of family planning . . . 
services specified for the program,” CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 24005 (Deering 2018), including 
sterilization and emergency contraceptive pills, Id. § 24007. 
 56.  It does seem odd, however, that the state interest in protecting women’s health would not allow 
states to encourage women to see a licensed medical provider for their pregnancy care. Pregnancy is a 
medical condition, with significant risk of complication and even death. It seems like an entirely 
legitimate use of the states’ public health police power to encourage women to be seen by someone who 
was professionally trained and licensed. 
 57.  “The legislature was concerned with women who may not be aware that certain health options 
are available to them, and wanted to ensure women in California are informed of the full range of free 
and low-cost services available to them when they make their reproductive decisions. In this way, the 
Act more closely resembles informed consent cases than deceptive advertising cases.” See A Woman’s 
Friend Pregnancy Res. Clinic v. Harris, 153 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1209 (E.D. Cal. 2015), aff’d, 669 F. 
App’x 495 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, judgment vacated sub nom. See also Cal. Health & Safety Code 
§ 123470 (West 2016). See also Public Health—Women—Reproductive Fact Act, 2015 Cal. Legis. 
Serv. Ch. 700 (A.B. 775) (West 2015). 
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decisions are time sensitive,” and so the state must supplement their public health 
education with materials placed in the clinic offices.58 
1. NIFLA v. Becerra in the Ninth Circuit 
The Act contained two critical parts. The first part required any pregnancy 
counseling center that was not licensed as a medical facility to conspicuously 
place a notice in the entrance of the facility, at least 8.5 inches by 11 inches in 
size and written in no less than 48-point type font, that stated that the facility 
“was not licensed as a medical facility and had no licensed medical provider.” 
They were also required to post this statement on billboards and any advertising 
materials for the CPC.59 Failure to comply resulted in a $500 fine for the first 
offense, and $1000 fines thereafter.60 This part of the Act will be referred to 
hereinafter as the “unlicensed disclosure” provision. 
The second part of the Act required licensed facilities to disclose that 
California has free or low-cost state-funded family planning options. 
Specifically, covered clinics must post in their waiting rooms, in printed 
materials, or digitally at check-in that “California has public programs that 
provide immediate free or low-cost access to comprehensive family planning 
services (including all FDA-approved methods of contraception), prenatal care, 
and abortion for eligible women. To determine whether you qualify, contact the 
county social services office at [insert the telephone number].”61 The stated 
reason for the Act was California’s desire that women have immediate access to 
California’s “comprehensive family planning services and pregnancy-related 
care through the Medi-Cal and the Family PACT programs.”62 This part of the 
Act will be referred to as the “licensed disclosure” provision. 
A handful of California CPCs petitioned for an injunction, to prevent the 
state of California from enforcing either part of the statute. They claimed that 
                                                            
 58.  A Woman’s Friend Pregnancy Res. Clinic v. Harris, 153 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1208 (E.D. Cal. 
2015), aff’d, 669 F. App’x 495 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, judgment vacated sub nom. See also 
Sections 1, 2 and 4 of California Stats.2015, c. 700 (A.B.775), which provide in part, “(a) All California 
women, regardless of income, should have access to reproductive health services . . . “(c) Because 
pregnancy decisions are time sensitive, and care early in pregnancy is important, California must 
supplement its own efforts to advise women of its reproductive health programs. In California, low-
income women can receive immediate access to free or low-cost comprehensive family planning 
services and pregnancy-related care through the Medi-Cal and the Family PACT programs. However, 
only Medi-Cal providers who are enrolled in the Family PACT program are authorized to enroll patients 
immediately at their health centers.” Cal. Health & Safety Code § 123470 (West YEAR). 
 59.  CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123472(b)(1) (Deering 2018). 
 60.  CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123473 (West YEAR). 
 61.  CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123472(a)(2). 
 62.  “Because pregnancy decisions are time sensitive, and care early in pregnancy is important, 
California must supplement its own efforts to advise women of its reproductive health programs. In 
California, low-income women can receive immediate access to free or low-cost comprehensive family 
planning services and pregnancy-related care through the Medi-Cal and the Family PACT programs.” 
Cal. Health & Safety Code § 123470 (West 2018). 
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both provisions violated their rights to free speech under the U.S. Constitution. 
The district courts and Ninth Circuit denied the injunctions.63 
Given the state’s consumer and health protection reasons for passing the law, 
the Ninth Circuit held that the unlicensed disclosure survived strict scrutiny and 
was viewpoint neutral.64 As for the licensed disclosure, the Ninth Circuit agreed 
that this provision regulated professional speech, and thus was subject to (and 
survived) intermediate scrutiny. As the Ninth Circuit was only applying 
intermediate scrutiny to this part of the Act, it held that the compelled speech 
need not be the least restrictive means necessary, and “[the notice] does not 
contain any more speech than necessary, nor does it encourage, suggest, or imply 
that women should use those state-funded services. The Licensed Notice is 
closely drawn to achieve California’s interests . . . .”65 According to the Court of 
Appeals, the petitioners could not demonstrate likely success on the merits of 
their First Amendment free speech claims for either part of the Act, so the 
injunction was denied.66 
The CPCs petitioned the Supreme Court for review, and in 2017, certiorari 
was granted in NIFLA v. Becerra.67 The Court certified the question of whether 
the Act’s compelled speech requirements violate CPCs’ right to free speech 
under the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The case would resolve the 
conflict between the Fourth and Ninth Circuits as to how to classify the relevant 
speech and the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply. Oral arguments were heard 
in the spring of 2018, and the opinion was issued in June of 2018. 
2. The Supreme Court Protects CPCs’ Right to Deceive by Holding that 
they are Not Medical Providers 
The Supreme Court had a different interpretation of both the applicable 
precedent and the statute itself. The majority granted the CPCs’ injunction, 
                                                            
 63.  Nat’l Inst. Of Family & Life Advocates v. Harris, 839 F.3d 823 (9th Cir. 2016) rev’d and 
remanded sub nom., Nat’l Inst. Of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018). 
 64.  A few district courts found the licensed disclosure to be a regulation of professional, not 
ideological speech, and therefore subject to heightened, but not strict, constitutional review. See 
Mountain Right to Life, Inc. v. Becerra, 692 F. App’x 807, 808 (9th Cir. 2017); Livingwell Med. Clinic, 
Inc. v. Harris, 669 F. App’x 493, 493-95 (9th Cir. 2016); A Woman’s Friend Pregnancy Res. Clinic v. 
Harris, 153 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1199 (E.D. Cal. 2015), aff’d, A Woman’s Friend Pregnancy Res. Clinic v. 
Harris, 669 F. App’x 495 (9th Cir. 2016). See also Centro Tepeyac v. Montgomery Cty., 722 F.3d 184, 
189 (4th Cir. 2013) (“The court observed that content-based speech regulations ordinarily are subject to 
strict scrutiny, but that lesser degrees of scrutiny may apply where the speech at issue is, inter alia, 
commercial or professional.”). 
 65.  Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates, 839 F.3d at 842. 
 66.  “California has a substantial interest in the health of its citizens, including ensuring that its 
citizens have access to and adequate information about constitutionally-protected medical services like 
abortion. The California Legislature determined that a substantial number of California citizens may not 
be aware of, or have access to, medical services relevant to pregnancy.” Nat’l Inst. Of Family & Life 
Advocates v. Harris, 839 F.3d 823, 841 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 67.  Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 464 (2017). 
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prohibiting enforcement of the Act.68 Justice Thomas wrote for the majority, 
finding that both parts of the Act “likely violated” the CPCs’ right to free 
speech.69 The Court achieved this result by making a series of creative but 
disingenuous moves. Each of these moves rested on the factually inaccurate and 
easily disprovable assumption that the CPCs are not practicing medicine or 
providing medical services. 
The cornerstone of petitioner’s argument was that CPCs were not medical 
providers and what they do is not considered a medical intervention. There is a 
mismatch, then, between how CPCs present themselves before the Supreme 
Court, and how they are presenting themselves to the public. It was this mismatch 
that the state of California sought to rectify with its Act, by requiring CPCs to 
disclose their true unlicensed nature. And, given that the case was resolved at the 
preliminary injunction phase, without much fact-finding, it is this very mismatch 
that the CPCs successfully exploited before the Supreme Court to deem their 
speech more protected than that of a licensed physician. 
Consider this telling exchange between NIFLA’s attorney, Michael Farris, 
and Justice Ginsburg. Justice Ginsburg was evidently trying to understand why 
the state of California could not compel a CPC to offer accurate and non-
misleading medical information to pregnant women, something constitutionally 
permissible under Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.70 
 
Justice Ginsburg: “But why isn’t this also informed consent? . . . So—
so that the patient will know what are the array of services available to 
her?” 
 
Michael Farris: “Your Honor, the services provided by our licensed 
centers are not medical interventions.”71 
 
Petitioner’s attorney conceded that if the state of California considered CPCs 
to be practicing medicine, they could prosecute them for the unauthorized 
practice of medicine.72 However, NIFLA’s attorney also stated that they do not 
think they are practicing medicine or providing medical interventions, despite 
their stated compliance with HIPAA requirements that only apply to medical 
covered entities, or their provision of pregnancy tests, counseling, exams, or 
ultrasounds, any of which would constitute the practice of medicine in any 
                                                            
 68.  Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018). 
 69.  Id. at 2380. 
 70.  505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 71.  Oral Argument at 01:51, Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 
(2018) (No. 16-1140), https://www.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-1140 [https://perma.cc/4HRK-9JQQ]. 
 72.  Oral Argument at 17:39, Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 
(2018) (No. 16-1140), https://www.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-1140 [https://perma.cc/4HRK-9JQQ]. 
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state.73 To reiterate, what the CPCs advertise themselves as providing, and what 
they actually provide, should be considered medical services, interventions, and 
the practice of medicine in every single U.S. state. The CPCs’ definition of “the 
practice of medicine” finds no support under any existing state law. 
a. Is the CPC speaking as a commercial, ideological, or medical 
entity? 
The classification of the speech is central for First Amendment analyses. 
This is a particularly difficult task in the present case, as CPCs demonstrate 
aspects of all three types of speech: commercial, professional, and ideological. 
It is therefore no surprise that there was a conflict between the district courts 
about how to classify the speech of CPCs. While the distinctions between each 
type are not as clear as they once were, federal precedent has mostly assumed 
that these categories were mutually exclusive. 
If the CPCs were engaged in purely commercial speech, the statutes in 
question would traditionally be subject to mere rational basis review.74 Under 
rational basis, the state need only offer a plausible basis for the legislation that is 
minimally connected to the Act. In effect, this means the CPCs would not be 
given First Amendment protection when they are misleading consumers or when 
the compelled speech serves to ensure the provision of accurate information.75 
The main objective in the analysis of compelled commercial speech is “the 
protection of the consumer’s interest in the free flow of truthful commercial 
information.”76 
The Supreme Court has recently complicated these traditional distinctions a 
bit, however, offering greater protection to some forms of commercial speech. 
In Sorrell v. IMS, the Court applied “heightened” scrutiny to a Vermont 
consumer protection statute that prohibited data-miners and pharmaceutical 
manufacturers from selling or using a doctor’s prescribing information.77 
Understanding the information disclosure objective of commercial speech 
regulation helps to explain Sorrell, where the Court found that restrictions on 
commercial speech (rather than the more typical compelled speech) violated the 
First Amendment.78 In this same case, Justice Breyer reminded the majority that 
the courts should exercise caution before applying heightened scrutiny 
                                                            
 73.  Oral Argument at 19:51, Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 
(2018) (No. 16-1140), https://www.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-1140 [https://perma.cc/4HRK-9JQQ]. More 
will be said about the unlawful practice of medicine, and the state’s ability to prosecute CPCs under this 
authority. See discussion infra Section IV. 
 74.  A Woman’s Friend Pregnancy Res. Clinic v. Harris, 153 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1199 (E.D. Cal. 
2015), aff’d, 669 F. App’x 495 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 75.  The Central Hudson test informs the proper regulation of commercial speech. 
 76.  United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 426 (2001). 
 77.  564 U.S. 552 (2011). 
 78.  Id. at 564. 
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“whenever such a program burdens speech” as this would frustrate separation of 
powers and “distort or undermine legitimate legislative objectives.”79 Even 
though Sorrell was about restricting rather than compelling speech, this case can 
be read as signaling an erosion of the typical deference afforded to state 
consumer-protection statutes. 
In the case of California’s FACT Act, federal courts applied the traditional 
framework for commercial speech. In First Resort v. Herrera, the Ninth Circuit 
held that whether speech is commercial “does not hinge solely on whether the 
[CPCs have] an economic motive.”80 Under this view, even speech that is 
provided by volunteers can be classified as commercial as it is spoken in a 
“marketplace” for reproductive services. And if it is commercial, the Act would 
be a permissible regulation on the dissemination of false or misleading 
statements.81 
Professional speech, on the other hand, has traditionally been afforded 
intermediate review. This was justified because professionals, “through their 
education and training, have access to a corpus of specialized knowledge that 
their clients usually do not” and that clients put “their health or their livelihood 
in the hands of those who utilize knowledge and methods with which [they] 
ordinarily have little or no familiarity.”82 Intermediate review meant that the 
regulation need not be the least restrictive necessary to further a compelling state 
interest. As the Act applied both to licensed and unlicensed facilities, there was 
at least some argument that the speech is not professional, particularly when it is 
compelled by CPCs that have no professional or licensed staff.83 But given that 
the CPCs presented themselves as medical providers, and did offer some 
professional services such as diagnosing pregnancies and offering ultrasounds, 
there was also an argument that they were engaged in professional speech. The 
Ninth Circuit adopted this latter argument, finding the CPCs to be engaged in 
professional speech.84 
The Fourth Circuit disagreed even further and found CPCs’ speech to be 
ideological due to their pro-life agenda.85 This interpretation was bolstered by 
the fact that the CPCs offered free services and products. Ideological speech is 
afforded the greatest First Amendment protection. It is assumed that the state’s 
                                                            
 79.  Id. at 584-85 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 80.  First Resort, Inc. v. Herrera, 860 F.3d 1263, 1273 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 81.  Id. at 1273-74. 
 82.  Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Harris, 839 F.3d 823, 839 (9th Cir. 2016), rev’d and 
remanded sub nom. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018). 
 83.  Daniel Halberstam, Commercial Speech, Professional Speech, and the Constitutional Status of 
Social Institutions, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 771, 772-73 (1999). 
 84.  Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Harris, 839 F.3d 823, 839 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. 
granted in part sub nom. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 464, 199 L. Ed. 
2d 328 (2017), and rev’d and remanded sub nom. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 
138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018). 
 85.  Greater Baltimore Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc. v. Baltimore, 721 F.3d 264, 285 (4th Cir. 
2013). 
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purpose in compelling this speech is the most suspicious. Given this, restrictions 
on ideological speech are subjected to strict scrutiny, and absent compelling state 
interests, and a statutory scope that is narrowly tailored to address those state 
interests, the restriction will fail. 
The problem, of course, and the reason for the disparate treatment among 
federal courts, is that CPCs exhibit aspects of commercial, professional, and 
ideological speech. To the outside layperson, they appear to be a medical clinic, 
but to the sophisticated courts and attorneys, who have access to much more 
information about the mission and funding of CPCs, they are obviously 
ideological. And while they usually do not charge for their services, they are still 
at least partially commercial in that they are competing with licensed medical 
providers in the marketplace to offer a reproductive service. 
b. The Supreme Court Classifies CPC Speech as Ideological 
While the classification was far from obvious, then, the Supreme Court 
decided to treat CPCs’ speech as ideological. It did so by largely ignoring the 
way CPCs hold themselves out to the public and ignoring that much of what they 
do is a professional service. It also distinguished between speech and conduct, 
holding that precedent allowing greater regulation of professionals was targeted 
at professional speech that is incident to a professional service. This proved 
pivotal, as it allowed the Court to distinguish precedents upholding TRAP laws 
and other compelled disclosures in the marketplace of licensed physicians. 
3. The Unlicensed Disclosure Provision 
Given that CPCs advertise to the public for services, the unlicensed 
disclosure provision should have been uncontroversial. States have long 
recognized an interest in promoting consumer protection and regulating 
commerce to promote public health and safety. More specifically, the Supreme 
Court has also recognized the importance of ensuring that consumers know 
whether they are visiting a licensed medical provider.86 The state’s interest has 
been considered stronger than the individual practitioner’s freedoms.87 
Even if CPCs were not considered medical providers, regulations on 
professional speech have often been upheld to protect consumers. The Court has 
recognized that professionals can be required to provide “purely factual and 
uncontroversial information about the terms under which . . . services will be 
available.”88 In Zauderer, the Court upheld a requirement that attorneys disclose 
                                                            
 86.  Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889). 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 650-53 
(1985). 
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their contingency-fee payment structure to potential clients. The Court reasoned 
that the  
 
constitutionally protected interest in not providing any particular factual 
information in his advertising is minimal . . . [and] warning[s] or 
disclaimer[s] might be appropriately required . . . in order to dissipate the 
possibility of consumer confusion or deception.89 
 
In NIFLA, the majority stated that the Zauderer precedent did not apply 
because Zauderer applied only to purely factual information. Here, the Court 
stated that “information about state-sponsored services—including abortion, 
[are] hardly an ‘uncontroversial’ topic.”90 But this is where they reveal their 
category error and confuse the speaker (ideological, controversial pro-life group) 
with the speech (which is purely factual and should not itself be considered 
controversial).91 The Court then claimed that even if Zauderer did apply, 
however, the Act still failed, as the disclosures were “unjustified or unduly 
burdensome,”92 especially as applied to a CPC’s advertising materials.93 They 
did so by focusing on the cost of compliance to CPCs. 
Even though the majority classified the speech as ideological and unduly 
burdensome, it did not stop there. It decided to go further, and rejected the 
distinction between professional and non-professional speech, questioning 
lower-court analyses to the extent they applied an intermediate level of scrutiny. 
The Court reasoned that professional speech is “a difficult category to define 
with precision.”94 By imposing a licensure requirement, this “gives the States 
unfettered power to reduce a group’s First Amendment rights.”95 
Perhaps the most puzzling part of the majority’s opinion was the 
asymmetrical finding by the Court that the harm to pregnant women from CPCs’ 
deception was imaginary, and the harm to the CPCs by enforcing the Act was 
very real. In finding that the licensed disclosure provision was perhaps 
responding to a “purely hypothetical harm,”96 the Court ignored the briefing by 
the state and its legislative findings in passing the Act, which documented the 
extent to which women were being misled by CPCs. The legislature had provided 
ample evidence of harm, which the Court ignored.97 
                                                            
 89.  Id. at 651. 
 90.  Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2367 (2018). 
 91.  Previously, the Court had acknowledged that different types of content might be treated 
differently, even if still content-based and all subjected to strict scrutiny. 
 92.  Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates, 138 S. Ct. at 2372 (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651). 
 93.  Id. at 2373-76. 
 94.  Id. at 2375. 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  Id. at 2377. 
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In contrast, the harm to the CPCs from having to comply with the Act was 
considered by the Court to be “unjustified or unduly burdensome.”98 The Court 
then reasoned that “[e]ven if the State had presented a nonhypothetical 
justification, the FACT Act unduly burdens protected speech,” as “[i]t imposes 
a government-scripted, speaker-based disclosure requirement” that applies 
regardless of whether the CPCs disclose their non-licensed status on their 
website.99 Of course, this assumes that everyone has access to these 
advertisements before entering the CPC. 
4. The Majority Places Much Consumer Protection Law at Constitutional 
Risk 
By describing the disclosure in this way, the Court cast too wide of a net, 
rendering many consumer protection statutes unconstitutional. As Breyer’s 
dissent correctly points out, this aspect of NIFLA has the potential for sweeping 
impact outside of the abortion context, as “virtually every disclosure law could 
be considered ‘content based,’ for virtually every disclosure law requires 
individuals to speak a particular message.”100 
The majority responds that “[c]ontrary to the suggestion in the dissent, we 
do not question the legality of health and safety warnings long considered 
permissible, or purely factual and uncontroversial disclosures about commercial 
products.”101 But if the FACT Act is not considered a regulation to protect health 
and safety, it is hard to imagine what would be. The majority’s opinion offers no 
guidance on this score. Why is the Act not directed at protecting public health? 
The Court’s confusing reasoning could invalidate many state regulations, of 
such things as cigarettes, securities, guns, or environmental pollutants, on First 
Amendment grounds. States typically do not require non-polluters to state that 
                                                            
as the ability of the state to prosecute for the unlawful practice of medicine or under general state 
consumer protection laws. However, the bill specified the harm the Reproductive FACT Act was meant 
to address, namely that “In 2012, more than 2.6 million California women were in need of publicly 
funded family planning services. More than 700,000 California women become pregnant every year and 
one-half of these pregnancies are unintended. In 2010, 64.3 percent of unplanned births in California 
were publicly funded. Yet, at the moment they learn that they are pregnant, thousands of women remain 
unaware of the public programs available to provide them with contraception, health education and 
counseling, family planning, prenatal care, abortion, or delivery. Because pregnancy decisions are time 
sensitive, and care early in pregnancy is important, California must supplement its own efforts to advise 
women of its reproductive health programs. In California, low-income women can receive immediate 
access to free or low-cost comprehensive family planning services and pregnancy-related care through 
the Medi–Cal and the Family PACT programs.” See PUBLIC HEALTH—WOMEN—
REPRODUCTIVE FACT ACT, 2015 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 700 (A.B. 775) (WEST).  
 98.  Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates, 138 S. Ct. at 2372 (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651). 
 99.  Id. at 2377. 
 100.  Id. at 2380 (Breyer, J., dissenting). “[M]uch, perhaps most, human behavior takes place 
through speech and because much, perhaps most, law regulates that speech in terms of its content, the 
majority’s approach at the least threatens considerable litigation over the constitutional validity of much, 
perhaps most, government regulation.” Id. 
 101.  Id. at 2376. 
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they are non-polluting, or that non-cigarettes do not contain nicotine. If passing 
legislation that targets the deceivers is considered impermissible “government-
scripted” content discrimination, then much regulation of controversial products 
or industries would be unconstitutional. And the majority’s general disclaimer 
that this is not what they meant “seem[s] more likely to invite litigation than to 
provide needed limitation and clarification.”102 
This holding is quite disturbing and far-reaching. CPCs create deceptive 
advertising, and then cannot be required to correct it. Imagine if a gun 
manufacturer misled consumers to believe that a gun could do things that it could 
not do, or was safer than it was. Then, imagine the state passing a law requiring 
the manufacturer to correct this deception. Under the Supreme Court’s opinion 
in NIFLA, the statute could be presumptively unconstitutional, as the subject 
matter is controversial (guns) and the disclosure might cost the gun 
manufacturers money. This would, of course, ignore the fact that it was the 
actions of the gun manufacturers that created the deception in the first place. This 
paradoxical outcome should be alarming to anyone concerned about deceptive 
advertising. 
5. The Licensed Disclosure Provision 
The Supreme Court also found that the second part of the Act likely violated 
the CPCs’ right to free speech. As with the unlicensed disclosure, the bulk of the 
constitutional work was done when it classified the CPCs’ speech as ideological 
rather than professional. Recall that in Zauderer, professional speech could be 
regulated for consumer protection.103 
a. To Distinguish Casey, CPCs Deemed To Not Be Providing 
Medical Services, and the Licensed Disclosure was Not Informed 
Consent 
The Court made it clear that the licensed disclosure is not “an informed 
consent requirement or any other regulation of professional conduct.”104 This is 
because it is not tied to the provision of a “medical procedure,” and applies to all 
interactions between a CPC and a pregnant woman.105 Of course, this is a very 
narrow reading of informed consent doctrine, as licensed doctors can be and have 
been required to provide information to women that is disconnected from a 
medical procedure. For example, when physicians provide information about the 
likely side effects of medications, something they are legally required to do, this 
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 104.  Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates, 138 S. Ct. at 2373. 
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disclosure would not be part of medical informed consent under the NIFLA 
framework. Likewise, outside of the health care context, employers can be 
required to post safety notices in their break-rooms that do not directly apply to 
their employee’s immediate conduct, and restaurants that serve alcohol can be 
required to post notices about the risks of drinking alcohol, regardless of whether 
a patron orders any alcoholic beverages. Never before have health disclosures 
needed to be immediately tied to the speaker’s conduct to pass First Amendment 
scrutiny. 
The requirement that the health and safety disclosure be limited to those 
instances where a “medical procedure” is immediately to be performed also 
reflects a very narrow, and incorrect, reading of what it means to practice 
medicine. Under this definition, pediatricians, geriatricians, general 
practitioners, infectious disease doctors, and many other specialties rarely 
practice medicine. These are considered “cognitive” specialties where 
procedures are not typically performed, and instead health care is discussed and 
monitored, and referrals are made. These physicians would almost certainly 
dispute the idea that medical services are only rendered, and informed consent is 
only required, when a procedure is about to be performed. To say that only 
“procedures” amount to medical services is bizarre and incorrect. It is also 
dismissive of the large majority of health care providers, who never perform, or 
bill for, any procedures, and yet who are still legally required to maintain a 
license to practice medicine. Further, if a CPC provides medical services at any 
point, which they do when diagnosing a pregnancy, conducting physical exams, 
or performing ultrasounds, it should be deemed a medical clinic. There is no such 
thing as a part-time or fractional medical clinic. After all, just because a 
physician fills out forms for patients who want to play sports or paperwork for 
insurance billing, these non-procedure activities do not render the clinic a non-
clinic. It is completely at odds with the concept of the “practice of medicine” to 
think of a medical clinic as only providing medical services when a physician is 
cutting open a patient. 
Of course, there was more to this rhetorical move than merely dodging 
Zauderer. It was critical to find that CPCs were not practicing medicine in order 
to distinguish the informed consent precedent specific to abortion. Casey made 
it quite clear that the state could require providers to offer non-misleading and 
accurate information as part of informed consent to abortion, and that this 
requirement would not violate due process or free speech.106 But because the 
Supreme Court did not view the CPCs as medical providers, they did not apply 
Casey. The FACT Act disclosures, they reasoned, could be made in the lobby of 
the pseudo-clinic, before any medical procedures were technically provided. 
There was no medical procedure being performed yet, and because the CPCs are 
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not medical providers, there may never be any medical service provided. 
Apparently, to the NIFLA majority, informed consent is only triggered moments 
before an abortion procedure is about to be performed—and not as part of general 
reproductive counseling.107 In oral argument, Justice Sotomayor recognized the 
problem with this, asking “how’s [what a CPC does] different from what a doctor 
does? When you go in for a pregnancy, you see the doctor, and the doctor will 
describe, hopefully, the benefits of a pregnancy and perhaps its risk because, 
depending—not all pregnancies are without complications. So this is consulting 
about a medical condition. How is that any different than Casey? You come in 
to talk to an—a doctor about abortion.”108 NIFLA’s attorney responded that this 
was different because Casey applied to doctors, and NIFLA is not a medical 
provider. Justice Sotomayor responded, “now you’re redefining medicine.”109 
Indeed. 
If the Court had focused on the reasonable perspective of the listener, and 
analogized the CPCs to medical providers, it would have been fairly simple for 
the Court to allow the disclosures as part of the proper regulation of medicine 
and/or professional speech. It is patently unjust to allow CPCs to deceive women, 
and then not allow states to correct this deception through disclosure 
requirements that target the deception where it occurs. 
With Zauderer and Casey out of the way, the Court still needed to 
demonstrate that the regulation was not narrowly tailored. Here, the Court missed 
a step by suggesting (but not finding) that the Act discriminated based on 
viewpoint and interpreting any evidentiary ambiguity in favor of NIFLA. While 
“the Government bears the burden of proof on the ultimate question [of the 
statute’s] constitutionality,”110 the Court was overly dismissive of California’s 
evidence regarding the need for tailoring its statute in the way that it did. Namely, 
the Court dismissed the evidence that a public outreach campaign would be 
ineffective and would leave many women vulnerable to the CPC’s deceptive 
practices.111 
                                                            
 107.  This is surprising, as courts have held that providing women counseling and prenatal vitamins 
constitutes the practice of medicine, to which regular tort law informed consent would attach. 
 108.  Oral Argument at 14:55, Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 
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 110.  Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 666 (2004). 
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advance the interest of ensuring that pregnant women are informed about their health care options. 
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time sensitive and care early in pregnancy is critical. Thus, women need to be notified of available 
resources as soon as possible. See Assem. Bill No. 775, § 1(a)-(d). The time-sensitive nature of 
pregnancy makes other policy options—such as a statewide advertising campaign, for example—
unavailable to the Legislature. As the author of AB 775 stated, the most effective way to make sure that 
pregnant women obtain the information and services they need during pregnancy in a timely way is to 
require a licensed health care facility to provide the required notice, especially if the facility does not 
provide the full spectrum of health care services.” Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3345301
2018] Crisis at the Pregnancy Center: Regulating Pseudo-Clinics 25 
NIFLA argued that the Act discriminated based on viewpoint because it 
exempted facilities that enroll patients in state-funded reproductive programs, 
which include abortion. By exempting these clinics, they argued, “the statute 
unnecessarily imposes a disproportionate burden upon facilities with pro-life 
views, the very facilities most likely to find the statute’s references to abortion 
morally abhorrent.”112 But, as Breyer points out in his dissent, the evidentiary 
record was insufficient on this score. The district court found that the exemption 
made sense because the exempted clinics “provide the entire spectrum of 
services required of the notice.”113 Absent discovery, there was no evidence that 
the Act disproportionately and unfairly impacted CPCs. True, poor pregnant 
women might visit exempt clinics, and they might benefit from the disclosure 
that the state offers low-cost or free reproductive options. But there was nothing 
in the record to suggest that the exempt clinics were not already providing this 
information, as respondents claimed.114 
The Court reasoned that if the state interest was in informing women that 
state-funded public health options were available, California should have 
required all clinics to disclose this availability, and not just those that fail to offer 
the relevant services. In oral argument, the state’s attorney attempted to argue 
that it limited the compelled speech to only those speakers necessitating the 
disclosure. The Act could have been deemed over-inclusive if it had required 
clinics providing abortion and contraception to advertise the availability of state-
funding for the same, without any evidence that this disclosure was necessary. 
Indeed, in discussing the unlicensed disclosure, the NIFLA Court recognized that 
“disclosures [must] remedy a harm that is ‘potentially real not purely 
hypothetical’ and the remedy must extend “no broader than reasonably 
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13649183 (S.D. Cal.). 
 
 112.  Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2388-89 (2018) (citing 
Brief for Petitioners 31-37). 
 113.  See Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Harris, No. 15CV2277 JAH(DHB), 2016 WL 
3627327, at *10 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2016), aff’d, 839 F.3d 823 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. granted in part sub 
nom. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 464, 199 L. Ed. 2d 328 (2017), and 
rev’d and remanded sub nom. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 201 
L. Ed. 2d 835 (2018), and rev’d in part, vacated in part sub nom. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life 
Advocates v. Becerra, 902 F.3d 900 (9th Cir. 2018). For defendants’ arguments on this point, see also 
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narrowly tailored to the stated interest of ensuring that pregnant women are aware of the full spectrum 
of pregnancy-related health care services in California because the specific language of the notice 
speaks to that entire spectrum. In other words, the notice does not simply mention ‘abortion.’ Rather, the 
notice inclusively refers to ‘comprehensive family planning services (including all FDA-approved 
methods of contraception), prenatal care, and abortion for eligible women.’ § 123472(a)(1). To put it 
another way, the notice does not express a particular opinion or view, or make a specific 
recommendation. It simply conveys the objective range of information—no more.” National Institute of 
Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra, 2018 WL 388836 (U.S.) at 29. 
 114.  Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Harris, 839 F.3d 823, 844-45 (9th Cir. 2016); Nat’l 
Inst. of Family & Life Advocates, 138 S. Ct. at 2377. 
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necessary.”115 The state of California argued that it targeted the CPCs because 
that is where the deception existed, as there was no documented failure to inform 
women of state-funded reproductive services by private clinics offering general 
obstetric services. Regardless, the appearance of regulating a pro-life perspective 
led the Court, and Justice Kennedy in his concurrence,116 to find that this part of 
the legislation was probably viewpoint discrimination, and, at the very least, was 
“wildly underinclusive,”117 and thus failed strict scrutiny.118 
C. NIFLA Allows Ideological Speakers to Deceive 
The problem with classifying the speech of CPCs is that they are less 
deceptive in the disclosures they provide online. After requiring several clicks, 
the CPC website will state that they do not provide abortions and they counsel 
from a pro-life, Christian perspective. However, many of the women seeking a 
CPCs services might never visit its website. If they do, they might not read the 
fine print in the online disclaimers, or successfully click through the pseudo-
clinical content to get to their ideological disclosures. This disparity allows CPCs 
to advertise as medical clinics but be regulated as ideologues. 
In finding that the CPCs are ideological speakers, the Court ignored the 
perspective of the listener. As one scholar explained, “the state’s regulatory 
authority may be triggered by the fact that an individual holds herself out as a 
professional, whether she is actually a professional or not.”119 This suggests that 
the clandestine intent of the speaker should not control. If the listener reasonably 
believes, based on the objective manifestations of the speaker, that the speaker 
is professional, then the speaker’s private, secretive ideology should not provide 
for greater First Amendment protection. This view makes abundant sense if the 
state’s interest in passing the disclosure ordinance was to protect consumers. 
Unfortunately, this is not the approach that the majority took in NIFLA. 
                                                            
 115.  Nat’l Inst. Of Family & Life Advocates, 138 S. Ct. at 2377 (citing Ibanez v. Florida Dep’t of 
Business & Professional Regulation, 512 U.S. 136, 146 (1994); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982); 
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Given how politicized access to abortion has become, it is no surprise that 
the First Amendment has protected politicized speech around abortion services. 
However, the NIFLA opinion goes further than necessary to protect deception. 
In so doing, the opinion signals to legislatures that consumer protection statutes 
cannot provide an effective remedy against CPCs’ deceptive practices. Even if 
California gathered sufficient evidence that demonstrated the need to correct 
CPC’s deceptive practices, the state would still face the hurdle of this speech 
being considered purely ideological. Further, the current Court sent strong 
signals that they would dismiss public health state interests as not being 
sufficiently compelling. This indicates a tremendous amount of judicial 
deference to the CPCs’ speech. If states want to effectively curb CPCs’ deceptive 
practices, they will need to pursue other avenues. 
II. REGULATING CPCS THROUGH TORT LAW 
A. Legal Tools Discussed Thus Far Require the Political Will of Elected 
Officials 
There are myriad legal tools in the arsenal of the state attorneys general or 
legislators who would like to eliminate the misleading practices of pseudo-
clinics, such as CPCs. 
The biggest disadvantage to the public consumer protection statutes that will 
be discussed, infra, at Section IV, is that each requires the political will of elected 
officials to prosecute CPCs. A private individual cannot prosecute a CPC that 
deliberately misleads women, engages in the unauthorized practice of medicine, 
or promotes unapproved uses of an FDA-approved device. Unfortunately, 
elected officials, including county or state prosecutors, frequently choose not to 
champion the rights of women or support women’s reproductive choices. This 
means that private women, especially those who live in conservative states, 
cannot rely on these consumer protection statutes and regulations to challenge 
the CPCs. Without a legal remedy, the rights these measures seek to protect are 
meaningless. 
B. Tort Law Puts the Injured Party in the Driver’s Seat 
It is in this space, where something is either under-regulated or regulations 
are under-enforced, that the law of torts does its best and most useful work. This 
Article advocates that individual women should sue CPCs in tort law for the 
intentional tort of battery. While this approach presents its own challenges 
related to the emotional and financial burdens of litigation, as well as the fact 
that the litigation comes after the harm has occurred, it still has significant 
advantages over passively waiting for prosecution under consumer protection 
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statutes. Tort law puts the injured party in the driver’s seat. In contrast to public 
actions, which typically involve the remedy of injunctions, a battery lawsuit 
allows the plaintiff to receive some compensation from the CPCs, which might 
include punitive damages. Finally, it does not in any way undermine public 
officials’ ability to enforce deceptive CPC practices through other means. Tort 
law can work in tandem with public efforts to minimize the deceptive and 
harmful practices of CPCs. But, when officials sit on their hands and allow 
consumers to be deceived, torts are a terrific remedy. 
A tort claim would function something like the following. Any time that a 
woman is touched by a CPC staff member, if the touching is only consented to 
through deception by the CPC, she should be able to prevail on a civil battery 
claim. Battery honors the individual’s dignity and is not deferential to an industry 
standard of care, unlike a case for medical malpractice, which would apply only 
if the CPCs were licensed, professional health care providers. 
Before explaining why the battery tort is such a great tool for women who 
have been injured by a CPC to seek redress, this Article will discuss the history 
and purpose behind this old intentional tort, and the ways in which TRAP laws 
have perverted the doctrine of battery and informed consent. The use of battery 
in this context might help redefine and reclaim this doctrine, to challenge the 
frequent pro-life blurring of the medical with the ideological. Informed consent 
means something; it is not merely a vehicle through which to shoehorn ideology. 
C. The History of Battery and its Elements 
The battery cause of action is one of the oldest torts, and has deep roots in 
our common law’s desire to protect the personal dignity of individuals and their 
ability to decide how, by whom, and under which circumstances they are 
touched. This is one of the most basic rights in our common law. To make out a 
civil claim of battery, a plaintiff must prove that each of these elements is more 
likely than not to have occurred: (1) the defendant intentionally touched the 
plaintiff (2) in a way that was objectively harmful or offensive and (3) the 
plaintiff did not consent to the touching, nor was it privileged (say, as part of a 
lawful police arrest).120 
Pregnant women who were misled about the purpose of their visit to the CPC 
may bring battery claims against the CPC staff who touched them in offensive 
ways, violating their personal dignity.121 A pregnant woman who is examined by 
a CPC volunteer and physically touched—including having her pulse taken, but 
                                                            
 120.  6 AM. JUR. 2D Assault and Battery § 85 (2018). 
 121.  W. Page Keeton et al., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 9, 41 (5th ed. 1984) 
(“The element of personal indignity involved always has been given considerable weight. Consequently, 
the defendant is liable not only for contacts which do actual physical harm, but also for those relatively 
trivial ones which are merely offensive and insulting.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: 
INTENTIONAL TORTS TO PERSONS § 101 (AM. LAW INSt., Tentative Draft No. 1, 2014). 
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especially undergoing a vaginal exam or ultrasound—could rather easily make 
out a battery claim if she reasonably finds the touching offensive because she 
consented to the touching under false pretenses.122 The minority of women who 
are not touched by CPC staff, perhaps because they came in for counseling and 
left before being seen by one of their volunteers, would not be able to bring a 
battery claim. However, it is the physical touching and examination of pregnant 
women that leads to the dangers this Article seeks to prevent, as the pregnancy 
evaluations and exams are the pseudo-medical activities that create the false 
sense that the pregnant women are being seen by licensed physicians. Where 
women are only receiving pamphlets, there is less of a risk that they will delay 
obtaining proper medical care as a result. 
1. Plaintiffs Do Not Need to Prove the CPCs Physically Injured Them 
Contrary to popular understanding, the intentional touching need not bruise 
or physically injure the plaintiff if the claim is for offensive touching.123 The 
“grievance consists in the offense to the dignity involved in the unpermitted and 
intentional invasion of the inviolability of his person and not in any physical 
harm done to his body.”124 Examples of offensive touching include spitting in 
someone’s face,125 removing someone’s hat,126 or tackling someone too 
aggressively in a junior-high football league.127 
Further, the plaintiff need not even be aware at the time that a battery took 
place. The insult to the plaintiff’s integrity “is as keenly felt by one who only 
knows after the event that an indignity has been perpetrated upon him as by one 
who is conscious of it while it is being perpetrated.”128 Thus, a surgeon who 
examines an anesthetized person without her consent could be liable for a 
battery. So too could a man who kisses a woman, without waking her, while she 
is asleep.129 
2. Plaintiffs Do Not Need to Prove that the CPC Had Malicious Intent 
To satisfy the intentional component of the battery claim, courts merely 
require that the touching was voluntary and the defendant intended to make 
                                                            
 122.  Brittany A. Campbell, The Crisis Inside Crisis Pregnancy Centers: How to Stop These 
Facilities from Depriving Women of Their Reproductive Freedom, 37 B.C.J.L. & SOC. JUST. 73, 75 
(2017) (“The nurse attempted an external ultrasound, but because she claimed that the images were 
unclear, the nurse told Nicole she needed to perform a transvaginal scan instead, without explaining the 
intricacies of the procedure.”). 
 123.  Richard J. Kohlman, Assault and Battery, 1 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 613 (3d ed. 2017). 
 124.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 18 (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
 125.  Alcorn v. Mitchell, 63 Ill. 553 (1872); Draper v. Baker, 21 N.W. 527 (1884). 
 126.  Seigel v. Long, 53 So. 753 (1910). 
 127.  Koffman v. Garnett, 574 S.E.2d 258 (2003). 
 128.  RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 18 (AM. LAW INST. 1934) 
 129.  Id. 
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contact with someone’s person. This just means that the actor’s movement 
cannot be the result of an automatic reflex, such as a knee-jerk reaction, epileptic 
seizure, or coercion.130 There is no required intent to injure or offend, and there 
is no need to prove that the actor was “inspired by any personal hostility.”131 
Indeed, even a friendly practical joke can lead to a battery claim.132 While courts 
continue to bungle this standard, it remains the black letter common law, 
endorsed by the Restatement of Torts, that defendants need not intend to cause a 
harmful touching.133 They need merely intend to touch the plaintiff, in a way that 
turns out to be harmful or offensive.134 
3. Plaintiffs Must Prove the Touching Was Objectively Offensive 
To be objectively offensive, the touching must offend a community standard 
of what is considered appropriate. It is not enough that the individual herself be 
subjectively offended. Thus, a hug might not be objectively offensive, so long as 
it was not accompanied by other inappropriate language or intimidation. 
Touching someone’s shoulder in a crowded subway would likely also fail to be 
objectively offensive. The context matters greatly, and courts factor in the 
“usages of a decent society,” “polite manners,” and touching that is “customary 
. . . in the course of life.”135 The factfinder should consider any power imbalance, 
exploitation, or subordination in determining whether the touching is offensive. 
There is nothing customary or polite about allowing a stranger to touch your 
body, assess your medical situation, and offer personal reproductive advice—all 
under false pretenses. No one could say that it is unreasonable to be offended by 
such things. When we agree to the most intimate form of examination, and the 
most intimate form of counseling, it is not unreasonable to only do so when we 
think the person touching us is a licensed medical provider. A reasonable jury 
could easily find the touching by CPC staff offensive, even if a few pregnant 
women testified for the defense that they were not personally offended by 
fraudulent touching at the pseudo-clinics.136 Just as it does not matter whether 
                                                            
 130.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: INTENTIONAL TORTS TO PERSONS § 101 (AM. LAW INSt., 
Tentative Draft No. 1, 2014). 
 131.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13 (AM. LAW INSt.1965). 
 132.  Id. § 19; see also id. § 20 (1965); Fuerschbach v. Southwest Airlines, 439 F.3d 1197, 1209 
(Cal. 2006). 
 133.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: INTENTIONAL TORTS TO PERSONS § 101 (AM. LAW INSt., 
Discussion Draft, 2014). 
 134.  “The fact that the Wagners allege that Mr. Giese could not have intended to harm her, or 
understood that his attack would inflict injury or offense, is not relevant to the analysis of whether a 
battery occurred. So long as he intended to make that contact, and so long as that contact was one to 
which Mrs. Wagner had not given her consent, either expressly or by implication, he committed a 
battery.” Wagner v. Utah Dep’t of Human Servs., 122 P.3d 599, 610 (Utah 2005). 
 135.  Id. at 609 (“[F]or example, someone who shakes his hand against his silent wishes has not 
committed a harmful or offensive contact.”). 
 136.  Glover v. Oppleman, 178 F. Supp. 2d 622, 641 (W.D. Va. 2001). 
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one person might not find an uninvited kiss, or blowing smoke in one’s face, 
offensive, it does not matter whether a minority of women find the touching 
unobjectionable. The question for the courts is whether it is objectively 
reasonable for this plaintiff to be offended by the violation of her personal 
dignity, once she realizes the real motivation of the CPC. 
It is hard to imagine a touching that could be more offensive—asking a 
woman to expose her belly or submit to a vaginal exam, revealing private 
information about a pregnancy or a fetus that is growing inside of her (and 
possibly information about miscarriage or anatomical defects). If the woman 
agrees to this, it is almost always because she considers this to be a clinical 
encounter, and not an ideological one. If the CPC’s deceptive touching is not a 
violation of one’s dignity and right to control who gets to touch oneself, then it 
is hard to see what would be. The only way a judge could find that this sort of 
unconsented to touching was not a battery would be by misapplying the common 
law of civil battery for political ends. Indeed, the CPCs must know that women 
would not otherwise consent to such touching, or they would not work so hard, 
and fight all the way up to the Supreme Court, to deceive women in their 
advertising practices. Why do the CPCs try to take control of the conversation 
and mislead women about the nature of their services? Because they know that 
without the misleading tactics, they would not be granted access to pregnant 
women’s bodies. 
4. Misrepresentations Vitiate Consent 
In some states, the plaintiff needs to prove that the touching was not 
consented to, while in other states this is an affirmative defense the defendant 
must raise. Either way, if it is shown that the plaintiff reasonably misunderstood 
the purpose of the touching, due to misrepresentations by the defendant, then 
consenting to the medical exam or procedure will not bar her claim. Courts have 
long recognized that a plaintiff might have technically consented to a blood draw, 
for example, but thought the blood draw was for medical purposes. If the blood 
draw were instead for law enforcement purposes, the consent is invalid.137 
The “crux of a battery claim is an absence of consent on the part of the 
plaintiff.”138 Consent is contextual. A famous Torts treatise even uses a medical 
example to make this point. It states: the “plaintiff who consents to manipulation 
of her body in the belief that it is for medical purposes, when in fact it is only for 
the sexual gratification of the defendant,” can have a cause of action for 
battery.139 You could substitute “sexual gratification” for “attempting to do 
God’s work” and the same premise holds. The action for battery recognizes that 
                                                            
 137.  O’Brien v. Synnott, 72 A.3d 331, 335-36 (Vt. 2013). 
 138.  Shaw v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 973 F. Supp. 539, 547 (D. Md. 1997). 
 139.  DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 111 (2d ed. 2018). 
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the individual has a right to exclude others from touching her and to control the 
way they do so. Full stop. 
There are four different types of consent applicable to our facts, and 
satisfying the criteria for any of them would preclude liability: actual consent; 
apparent or implied consent; constructive consent; and the emergency 
doctrine.140 However, none of these categories of consent apply to preclude 
liability for the CPCs. First, there is no actual (express or implied) consent in the 
case where a pregnant woman is never explicitly told that the medically 
costumed volunteer is in fact unlicensed.141 
Likewise, the CPC cannot rely on “reasonably apparent consent,” or implied 
consent.142 While a patient might consent to “ordinary physical contacts that are 
medically necessary” when she visits her doctor for her annual physical, consent 
to the CPC cannot be inferred from the facts. In the oft-cited case of O’Brien v. 
Cunard S.S. Co.,143 the evidence that plaintiff held out her arm to be vaccinated, 
in a line of people exiting a ship, demonstrated not only that the defendant 
reasonably believed that she consented, but also that she did consent. This sort 
of implied consent is not present here; the pregnant woman is not implicitly 
consenting to a medical exam by the CPC. She is consenting to an exam by a 
different person and in a different context. 
While a defendant would not be liable for battery if a reasonable person in 
the position of the actor believes that the would-be plaintiff consented to the 
actor’s otherwise tortious conduct,144 it would be unreasonable for a CPC staff 
member to believe that the pregnant woman had truly consented, given the 
CPC’s ideological agenda. As mentioned, supra at note 35 and the 
accompanying text, CPC staff are trained in applying deceptive practices to 
persuade women to carry the fetus to term. CPCs take advantage of these 
women’s relative lack of education, money, and insurance to deceive them into 
thinking they are receiving medical, as opposed to ideological, care. Given their 
deceptive playbook, and the fact that they do not tell pregnant women who 
appear at their clinics that they are unlicensed medical providers who do not 
provide the full range of reproductive services, consent to the touching cannot 
                                                            
 140.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: INTENTIONAL TORTS TO PERSONS § 111 (AM. LAW INSt., 
Discussion Draft, 2014). 
 141.  “Express consent may be given by words or affirmative conduct and implied consent may be 
manifested when a person takes no action, indicating an apparent willingness for the conduct to 
occur. The consent must be to the ‘defendant’s conduct, rather than to its consequences.’ A 
plaintiff’s consent is not effective if “the consenting person was mistaken about the nature and quality of 
the invasion intended by the conduct.” Barnes v. Am. Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 127, 148 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 142.  “If words or conduct are reasonably understood by another to be regarded as consent, they 
constitute apparent consent and are as effective as consent in fact...In determining whether conduct 
would be understood by a reasonable person as indicating consent, the customs of the community are to 
be taken into account.” Dubbs v. Head Start, Inc., 336 F.3d 1194, 1219 (10th Cir. 2003). 
 143.  28 N.E. 266 (Mass. 1891). 
 144.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: INTENTIONAL TORTS TO PERSONS § 115 (AM. LAW INSt., 
Discussion Draft, 2014). 
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be inferred or apparent from the facts. Indeed, given how CPCs deliberately 
locate very near Planned Parenthoods and adopt clinically-sounding names, the 
very reasonable and clear intention of CPCs is to gain access to women’s bodies 
through deception, not informed consent. 
Further, as discussed above under the “objectively offensive” element of 
battery, there is no constructive consent either. Several courts have recognized 
that “in a crowded world, a certain amount of personal contact is inevitable, and 
must be accepted. Absent expression to the contrary, consent is assumed to all 
those ordinary contacts which are customary and reasonably necessary to the 
common intercourse of life.”145 Examples of this include touching someone 
while hastily exiting a building during a fire alarm or brushing up against 
someone on a crowded bus. In those circumstances, there is something like a 
social necessity argument, as affordable public transportation requires “minor 
contact between passengers.”146 Commuters are thought to consent to this 
touching, as they are aware of the crowded nature of most public transit and 
nonetheless agree to this mode of transportation. But there is no such social 
consent in the present case. Pregnant women are not agreeing to a certain amount 
of battery in order to take advantage of a public good. 
Finally, emergency consent is not applicable. The emergency consent 
doctrine “reflects a narrow set of circumstances in which the actor reasonably 
believes that plaintiff would have consented, if he or she had the opportunity to 
do so, and in which it is imperative not to wait to see whether plaintiff really 
does consent.”147 In the kinds of cases contemplated here, there is plenty of time 
to obtain the pregnant woman’s consent. Failure to do so is not because there is 
an urgent, life-threatening clinical need that prevents asking the woman. The 
only reason the consent is not explicit is because the CPCs appreciate that they 
will lose access to women’s bodies if they are transparent about their ideological 
purpose. 
Thus, CPCs cannot avail themselves of any of the relevant types of consent 
to preclude their liability. CPCs that misled a woman into thinking that the 
purpose of the exam was to diagnose a pregnancy, or to offer medical counseling 
or advice, when the real purpose is to counsel the woman on pro-life, Christian 
ideology, would most certainly be liable in battery. To reiterate, where the 
consent to a procedure or touching is premised on fraud or misrepresentations, 
there is no valid consent.148 
                                                            
 145.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: INTENTIONAL TORTS TO PERSONS § 117 (AM. LAW INSt., 
Discussion Draft, 2014). 
 146.  Id. The Restatement adds, “Minor contact between passengers is reasonably necessary to 
achieve that [affordable and efficient public transit] social value.” Id. 
 147.  Id. § 118. 
 148.  “The plaintiff’s purported consent is ineffective to bar her claim if it is induced by 
misrepresentation or is given under a material mistake of which the defendant is or should be aware. The 
mistake is frequently though not always induced by the defendant’s fraud or misrepresentation. Many 
cases decided in many settings summarize the point by saying that ‘fraud vitiates consent’ or that 
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5 Battery Claims Do Not Balance the Rights to Batter Against the Right 
Not to be Battered 
Contrary to the First Amendment analysis in NIFLA or the structure of 
consumer protection or even medical malpractice laws, which might give too 
much deference to the defendant’s viewpoints or purpose, here, the reasons why 
the defendant battered the plaintiff are largely irrelevant.149 When the touching 
is not consented to, courts do not balance the interests of the batterer against the 
interests of the battered. The battery cause of action is about protecting the 
inviolate dignity of the individual person. In keeping with this, battery is not a 
paternalistic or ideological doctrine. The defendant cannot argue that they failed 
to disclose a material fact about the procedure in order to avoid any 
psychological harm to the plaintiff.150 Where the First Amendment may be 
interpreted in a way that protects misleading practices by CPCs, battery does not 
spare defendants who deliberately mislead. 
D. The Relationship Between Battery and Informed Consent 
In recent years, many states have passed special informed consent laws that 
are exclusive to the abortion context. These Targeted Regulation of Abortion 
Provider (TRAP) laws require abortion providers to say specific things to 
pregnant women as part of the informed consent process. Given that informed 
consent as a legal and ethical doctrine developed from the tort of battery, it will 
be useful to discuss how this occurred, in order to understand how these TRAP 
laws pervert the very notion of informed consent. 
Historically, informed consent suits began as intentional torts for 
unconsented-to touching by physicians, even where the care received was not 
negligent. One of the first cases to recognize the trespass to persons against a 
surgeon who operated on someone without her consent was Schloendorff v. 
Society of New York Hospital.151 In this 1914 case, the plaintiff claimed that the 
hospital staff removed her stomach tumor while she was under anesthesia, 
despite her explicit requests that they not do so.152 In deciding that the hospital 
                                                            
consent is ineffective if given as a result of fraud, meaning that the plaintiff in such a case can recover.” 
DOBBS ET AL., supra note 139. 
 149.  “[M]any torts that are classified as intentional differ from torts of negligence not so much 
because they represent a more serious degree of fault, but because they exhibit a type of fault not 
appropriately governed by the ‘reasonable care’ paradigm: They focus on protection of carefully defined 
interests (such as freedom from confinement, and choice about medical treatment or other physical 
touchings), while they limit legal protection to the most deliberate kinds of intrusions on these 
interests.” Kenneth W. Simons, A Restatement (Third) of Intentional Torts?, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 1061, 
1100 (2006). 
 150.  Kohoutek v. Hafner, 383 N.W.2d 295, 299 (Minn. 1986). 
 151.  Schloendorff v. Soc’y of New York Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914), abrogated by Bing v. 
Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3 (N.Y. 1957). 
 152.  Id. 
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could be liable for a battery, if not for negligence, Judge Cardozo famously stated 
that “[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine 
what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation 
without his patient’s consent, commits an assault, for which he is liable in 
damages.”153 A 1913 Oklahoma case further recognized that the skillful removal 
of a patient’s bone could constitute a battery, where the patient had not consented 
to its removal.154 Thus, even where there is not negligence, there can be a medical 
battery. 
In the medical context, the intentional tort has morphed into a negligence 
cause of action in all but a few states.155 This is because enough of a norm has 
developed through medical ethics and practice to say that the failure to provide 
relevant medical information to a patient, about the purpose and risks of their 
treatment, is now a breach of the professional standard of care. The American 
Medical Association has issued an ethics opinion, which states that “informed 
consent to medical treatment is fundamental in both ethics and law.”156 For 
medical professionals, what started as a battery is now considered medical 
malpractice. Where CPC facilities and staff are licensed as medical providers in 
their states, then, pregnant women should sue them for ordinary negligence and 
medical malpractice. Because it is recognized that medical providers should 
inform women of the purpose of their care, as well as the risks and benefits of 
any procedures, an informed consent claim should be easy to demonstrate. 
Importantly, while the Supreme Court declared in NIFLA that CPCs are not 
practicing medicine, and therefore the informed consent requirements of Casey 
did not apply, it is up to the states, and not federal courts, to determine whether 
entities are practicing medicine and subjected to professional malpractice claims 
under state law.157 
                                                            
 153.  Id. 
 154.  Rolater v. Strain, 137 P. 96, 97 (Okla. 1913). 
 155.  “Often informed consent claims blur into malpractice claims.” JANET DOLGIN & LOIS 
SHEPHERD, BIOETHICS AND THE LAW 59 (Wolters Kluwer ed., 2d ed. 2009). See also Bryan J. Warren, 
Pennsylvania Medical Informed Consent Law: A Call to Protect Patient Autonomy Rights by 
Abandoning the Battery Approach, 38 DUQ. L. REV. 917, 918 (2000); West’s A.L.R. Digest Health 
k907, ALRDG 198HK907 (2018). But see Perez v. Hu, 87 N.E.3d 1130, 1135 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) 
(“Lack of informed consent is viewed as a battery claim if there is an alleged complete lack of consent 
to medical treatment, but otherwise it is ‘regarded as a specific form of negligence for breach of the 
required standard of professional conduct.’”); Strachan v. John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp., 507 A.2d 
718 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986). 
 156.  Code of Medical Ethics Opinion 2.1.1, AM. MED. ASS’N, https://www.ama-
assn.org/delivering-care/informed-consent [https://perma.cc/6ARD-Z9WT] (last visited Nov. 19, 2018). 
 157.  The joint opinion in Casey explained that the law regulated speech only ‘as part of the 
practice of medicine, subject to reasonable licensing and regulation by the State.’” Planned Parenthood 
of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992) (emphasis added). Indeed, the 
requirement that a doctor obtain informed consent to perform an operation is “firmly entrenched in 
American tort law.” Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U. S. 261, 269 (1990). See, e.g., 
Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hospital, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914) (explaining that ‘a surgeon who 
performs an operation without his patient’s consent commits an assault.’”). 
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Canterbury v. Spence, one of the early cases to describe the tort of informed 
consent, stated that “[t]rue consent to what happens to one’s self is the informed 
exercise of a choice, and that entails an opportunity to evaluate knowledgeably 
the options available and the risks attendant upon each.”158 Today, making out a 
case for informed consent requires proving that the defendant breached a 
standard of care in terms of what reasonable physicians would share with a 
patient, or what prudent patients would find material to their decision to elect or 
forego treatment.159 The former standard asks what information a reasonable 
physician would provide, and reflects the idea that physicians cannot read 
patients’ minds to know what each would subjectively want to know. The latter 
“prudent patient” standard is applied in a slight minority of states, and focuses 
on the “risks, benefits, and options that a reasonable patient would want to know 
in reaching a treatment decision.”160 It is rooted in patient autonomy, and 
recognizes that while the physician may have expertise in clinical decision-
making, she is not an expert in what reasonable patients would want to have 
disclosed. 
1. TRAP Laws Pervert the Doctrine of Informed Consent 
Ironically, an article about abortion access could not address battery and 
informed consent without recognizing the absurd turns the doctrine has taken 
under states’ TRAP laws. TRAP laws are  
 
part of anti-abortion activists’ strategy to chip away at the legal availability 
of abortion . . . by heavily regulating the practice of providing abortions. 
These laws are examples of abortion exceptionalism, in which abortion is 
singled out for more restrictive government regulation as compared to other, 
similar procedures.161  
 
Legislators often justify these TRAP laws as being necessary for true informed 
consent, and many TRAP laws are placed in sections of the state code that apply 
to medical informed consent generally. A majority of states have such laws, 
which place requirements on abortion providers “that are more demanding than 
                                                            
 158.  Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
 159.  “In slightly over half the states, the legal standard for disclosure to patients is that which a 
“reasonable medical practitioner” would provide. This professionally defined standard is often that of 
the locality in which the practitioner works, or a similar locality. The disclosure standard in most other 
jurisdictions is that which would be sought by a prudent or reasonable patient, a standard that 
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Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899, 916 (1994). 
 160.  DOLGIN, supra note 155, at 49-50. 
 161.  Ian Vandewalker, Abortion and Informed Consent: How Biased Counseling Laws Mandate 
Violations of Medical Ethics, 19 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1, 2-3 (2012). 
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for any other medical procedure.”162 Occasionally, these TRAP laws pervert the 
legal and ethical doctrine of informed consent. 
For example, under the guise of “informed consent,” many states require 
physicians to provide specific, and sometimes misleading, information to 
women. An analysis of the mandatory pre-abortion informed consent materials 
in 23 states revealed that 45 percent of the statements about first trimester fetal 
development were medically inaccurate.163 Examples of inaccuracies included 
statements such as “brain activity can be recorded” at four-weeks’ gestation, or 
other statements that reported “baby-like” behaviors before they could be 
seen.164 
In addition to misinformation related to the development of the fetus, 
Missouri requires that the physician inform the pregnant woman that “[t]he life 
of each human being begins at conception. Abortion will terminate the life of a 
separate, unique, living human being.”165 Of course this blurs objective clinical 
information with religious ideology. It is ethically unsound to ask physicians to 
deliver propaganda for conservative legislators, shrouded in the veil of 
professional judgment. In any event, this uses the legitimate and professional 
voices of physicians as shoehorns for ideology, by erroneously treating it like 
other forms of medical informed consent. 
In Texas, women must be incorrectly told that having an abortion “may 
make it difficult or impossible to become pregnant in the future or carry a 
pregnancy to term.”166 In South Dakota, women are given information that 
abortion increases the risk of infertility, without making it clear that only a highly 
unlikely complication will increase this risk.167 Indiana provides some caveats, 
but the informed consent materials nonetheless leave the reader with the 
impression that abortion carries with it an increased risk of infertility and 
complications with future pregnancies. 168 Of course, this depends greatly on the 
gestational age of the fetus. Unqualified statements about abortion causing 
infertility are medically inaccurate, and yet physicians are required to share this 
false data in at least four states.169 In Indiana, pregnant women must be told that 
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 163.  Cynthia Daniels, et al., Informed or Misinformed Consent, Abortion Policy in the United 
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 166.  TEX. DEP’T OF HEALTH, A WOMAN’S RIGHT TO KNOW 17 (2003), 
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 167.  S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.1 (2017). 
 168.  IND. STATE DEP’T OF HEALTH, ABORTION INFORMED CONSENT BROCHURE 6, 
https://www.in.gov/isdh/files/Abortion_Informed_Consent_Brochure.pdf [https://perma.cc/AZT3-
VSVB]. 
 169.  Counseling and Waiting Periods for Abortion, GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, Oct. 2018, 
https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/counseling-and-waiting-periods-abortion 
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the fetus must be either buried in an “established cemetery” or “cremated” by the 
abortion clinic.170 
In thirteen states, women must be instructed on the ability of a fetus to feel 
pain.171 In Utah, physicians must share with pregnant women the puzzling 
statement that “substantial medical evidence” has shown that the “fetus is 
capable of feeling pain,” and thus anesthesia must be provided if the abortion is 
performed after 20 weeks’ gestation.172 First, there is no substantial evidence of 
this,173 and second, providing anesthesia would impose a significant risk on the 
pregnant woman and the fetus that may not be clinically justified. Requiring 
anesthesia after 20 weeks, for every pregnancy, violates norms of professional 
ethics, as the physician should not do harm to the patient that is not balanced by 
some corresponding benefit.174 
The presence of these “fetal pain” laws is even more confounding given that 
full-term, natural childbirth can be very painful for the baby. Objectively, this is 
a stressful event. Their 40 week skulls are compressed, their heart rate increases, 
and their bodies are mangled—but there is no requirement that a vaginal delivery 
be preceded by anesthesia in Utah or elsewhere. The discrepancy between the 
requirement that physicians administer anesthesia during abortions at 20 weeks, 
but not at full-term vaginal deliveries, reveals the true purpose behind these 
laws—to discourage women’s reproductive choices. Requiring a doctor to 
deliver this message again blurs the line between the clinical and the ideological. 
This is quite dangerous in a society predicated on secular delivery of health care 
and freedom of religious exercise. Indeed, the informed consent laws of Missouri 
are presently being challenged by a religious group that claims that in their view, 
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 171.  GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, supra note 169. For a constitutional analysis, see I. Glenn Cohen & 
Sadath Sayeed, Fetal Pain, Abortion, Viability, and the Constitution, 39 J. L., MED., & ETHICS 235 
(2011). 
 172.  Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-7-305, 76-7-308.5 (LexisNexis 2018) (“. . . [s]ubstantial medical 
evidence from studies concludes that an unborn child who is at least 20 weeks gestational age may be 
capable of experiencing pain during an abortion procedure . . . and the physician “shall administer an 
anesthetic or analgesic to eliminate or alleviate organic pain to the unborn child caused by the particular 
method of abortion to be employed.”). 
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 174.  See Andrea Smardon, Abortion Providers in Utah Adapt to New Anesthesia Requirement, 
NPR, April 7, 2016, https://www.npr.org/2016/04/07/473416741/abortion-providers-in-utah-adapt-to-
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Benjamin Moulton & Jaime S. King, Aligning Ethics with Medical Decision-Making: The Quest for 
Informed Patient Choice, 38 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 85, 86 (2010). 
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human life does not begin at conception, and the informed consent materials 
violate the Establishment Clause by endorsing Christian ideology.175 
2. TRAP Laws Ignore Casey’s Dicta on Informed Consent 
The 1992 Supreme Court case Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey made it clear that states can require physicians to inform 
women seeking abortion about the physiological development of the fetus or the 
risks of the abortion procedure.176 However, this was conditioned on the 
information being truthful and non-misleading,177 and allowing the physician to 
use her judgment to customize the information to the particular patient.178 The 
Casey Court made their reasoning explicit: it was not to add extraordinary 
informed consent in the abortion arena, but to place informed consent on equal 
footing with other areas of medicine. The message was that informed consent in 
abortion should be “no different” and the doctor-patient relation was “entitled to 
the same solicitude it receives in other contexts.”179 Further, in recognizing that 
previous abortion informed consent laws had been struck down, the Court 
distinguished those in Casey by stating that Pennsylvania’s laws were not 
“designed to dissuade the woman from having an abortion” and did not “impose 
a rigid requirement that a specific body of information be given in all cases, 
irrespective of the particular needs of the patient.”180 In NIFLA, discussed supra 
at [x], the Court narrowed the holding of Casey so that it only applied to licensed 
medical providers immediately before providing an abortion procedure. 
Legislators who have passed TRAP laws that require physicians to provide 
medically inaccurate or misleading information have ignored this important dicta 
from Casey.181 The part of Casey getting more attention is the general 
requirement that a TRAP law not place an “undue burden” on the exercise of the 
woman’s right. Casey’s undue burden test holds that “a provision of law is 
                                                            
 175.  Doe v. Greitens, 530 S.W.3d 571 (Mo. Ct. App. 2017). See also Linley Sanders, Abortion 
Rights Fight Has an Unlikely Champion: The Satanic Temple, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 6, 2017, 
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 176.  Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992). 
 177.  Id. 
 178.  “Critical to our decisions in Akron and Thornburgh to invalidate a governmental intrusion into 
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 179.  Casey, 505 U.S. at 884. 
 180.  Id. at 882. 
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invalid, if its purpose or effect is to place substantial obstacles in the path of a 
woman seeking an abortion.”182 The Circuits were somewhat split in terms of 
how to interpret this language and how much deference to give to empirical 
evidence to demonstrate an undue burden. However, the Supreme Court in 
Whole Woman’s Health offered guidance, stating that “[c]ourts are free to base 
their findings on commonsense inferences drawn from the evidence.”183 
Regardless of how future courts interpret this important test, however, legislators 
have deliberately ignored it, and Casey’s dicta on informed consent, when 
fashioning pro-life TRAP laws.184 This is perhaps because they were setting up 
legal challenges to Casey itself, anticipating the replacement of Justice Kennedy 
on the Supreme Court.185 
Informed consent is not some slippery placeholder that means whatever you 
want it to mean. It has a history and specific content. Informed consent means 
that accurate, relevant information will be shared with a competent patient, who 
will have adequate time to process it, understand it, and then use this information 
to make a voluntary medical decision.186 According to the American Medical 
Association’s Opinion on this matter, “[s]uccessful communication in the 
patient-physician relationship fosters trust and supports shared decision 
making,” and thus physicians must “[p]resent relevant information accurately 
and sensitively, in keeping with the patient’s preferences for receiving medical 
information.”187 The pregnant woman’s decision can be neither voluntary nor 
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informed if it is based on misrepresentations. But this is precisely what many 
TRAP laws, and deceptive CPCs, do. 
As Judith Daar correctly points out, the “informed consent” TRAP laws blur 
ethical clinical judgment with legislative ideology. According to Professor Daar, 
informed consent is not well supported when TRAP laws “foist a scripted 
message displaying the state’s moral repugnance to the proposed treatment 
plan.”188 Scholars in medical ethics have generally agreed that this requires 
physicians to “commit an untenable ethical and professional wrong—deceiving 
their patients by providing false information and withholding empirically 
derived, evidence-based clinical data.”189 Even so, as Jessie Hill points out, 
“courts tend to be highly permissive” of TRAP laws, while “they have often been 
more skeptical of disclosure requirements imposed on [CPCs].”190 It is this 
federal First Amendment jurisprudence protecting CPC deception that begs for 
a private, state tort remedy. 
E. The Practical Advantages of Battery Over Negligence Claims 
Battery places the victim of the harm in the driver’s seat, allowing her to 
decide whom to sue and for how much. Battery also entitles the plaintiff to 
potential punitive damages, in addition to any damages for her pain and suffering 
or dignitary harm.191 While punitive damages are rare, they are more likely to be 
awarded in intentional tort cases where there is willful misconduct, malice, or 
reckless disregard for the rights of others.192 If the jury finds that the particular 
CPC defendant willfully misled the plaintiff in order to get her to carry her 
pregnancy to term, then punitive damages might be warranted. This could make 
the lawsuit more attractive for plaintiffs’ attorneys to take on a contingency basis, 
which might improve access to justice for low-income women. 
Given that most states follow the physician-standard for informed consent, 
these cases will often require expert testimony as to what the physician should 
have disclosed. It can often be difficult for plaintiffs to find a physician who will 
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testify against another local physician in this regard. Further, even under the 
patient-standard, in order to prove the causation element of negligence the 
plaintiff needs to prove that, had she been adequately informed, she would have 
chosen to do something different. It is often difficult to prove causation, even 
where the patient could prove that some information was negligently withheld. 
Will the jury believe the claim that the patient would have chosen differently? 
In these respects, a battery claim is easier to prove. The battery plaintiff need 
not prove that the physician had a duty to disclose anything, that the failure was 
a breach of a professional standard of care, or that she would have chosen not to 
have the exam had she known its true nature.193 The battery cause of action is 
much more protective of the physical integrity of the plaintiff and does not 
balance this interest against the rights of the defendant. In a battery claim, there 
is no deference to the community or industry practices of defendants. 
Given that the petitioner in NIFLA claimed that it was not providing medical 
care, a civil plaintiff could cite this when arguing that an informed consent claim 
would be inappropriate for a plaintiff who is seen at an unlicensed CPC. But, 
more appropriately, the problem with an informed consent claim is that the 
defendant CPC is not a medical provider, and the elaborate ethical canons that 
have developed for physicians do not apply to unlicensed CPCs. The CPC 
plaintiff is not technically a patient, even if she thinks that she is. It is the unique 
position of the physician, and the sanctity of the physician-patient relationship, 
that has led to the development of informed consent as a claim. You cannot bring 
an informed consent-style claim against your auto-mechanic or plumber, nor can 
you bring one against a CPC. Instead, you would need to prove battery or 
ordinary negligence by the defendant. Under ordinary negligence, given that the 
plaintiff would be arguing that inadequate information was shared, this claim 
would be framed as a “failure to warn” type of claim. 
Failure to warn claims are notoriously difficult to win. This is because the 
common law does not impose affirmative duties to protect or warn on just any 
defendant; there must be a special relationship between the parties. Historically, 
the special relationship has been one where there is a power imbalance between 
the plaintiff and defendant, where the defendant is a fiduciary of the plaintiff, or 
where the plaintiff puts her safety or person in the custody of the defendant. The 
classic “special relationship” that give rise to a duty to warn are landlord/tenant, 
doctor/patient, and business/customer relationships. 
The CPC facility, in taking on a pseudo-clinical function and holdings its 
doors open to the public to provide counseling services, would quite likely be 
considered in a “special relationship” with the pregnant woman. Thus, the CPC 
would likely be under a duty to protect and warn the women it sees in its pseudo-
clinic, even when it is unlicensed. This could create obvious duties to provide 
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accurate and complete information to the woman. However, this argument would 
depend on the judge and her notions of what makes for good public policy. The 
judge makes decisions about whether there is a duty by looking to a long list of 
factors. Given the political context in which abortion cases are decided, and the 
historical inability for judges to treat abortion as unexceptional in tort,194 the 
negligence cause of action against CPCs is not as desirable as a battery claim. 
Moreover, damages in a negligence or informed consent case might be 
modest. Typically, negligence damages are awarded to pay for economic 
expenses and pain and suffering that result as a consequence of the breach. 
However, many states limit the amount of pain and suffering damages that can 
be awarded and might limit the economic damages if they are framed as caring 
for a healthy, unwanted, child. Such claims are unfortunately referred to as 
“wrongful birth” claims. 
If the negligence case is framed as a failure to provide adequate information 
that resulted in the birth of a child, some states prohibit this type of claim 
because, in their view, the birth of a child can never be an injury.195 States are 
about evenly split on whether they will allow for some recovery for the cost of 
raising a child when the traditional negligence elements are met.196 Some states 
will only allow for compensatory damages for child-rearing expenses when the 
child that is born has severe disabilities. This makes “wrongful birth” claims 
exceptional, when in reality calculating the damages from child care and medical 
expenses are quite ordinary, but courts have struggled with the philosophical 
implications of allowing the birth of a child to be an injury.197 If, instead, the 
claim is brought as a battery claim, the plaintiff will dodge this philosophical 
bullet. However, depending on the jurisdiction, the plaintiff may not be able to 
receive damages for regular child-rearing expenses. 
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IV. REGULATING CPCS AS PRACTICING MEDICINE WITHOUT A LICENSE 
A. Medical Licensing Laws Protect the Public and Have Been Deemed 
Constitutional 
NIFLA teaches states they will need to pursue other non-pregnancy-specific 
options if they want to protect their citizens from deceptive CPC practices. The 
next option that will be explored is the prosecution of CPCs for the unlicensed 
practice of medicine. Even the petitioners in NIFLA acknowledged this 
possibility, though they seemed confident that they were not practicing medicine. 
Assuming, arguendo, that NIFLA does not practice medicine under a free speech 
analysis, many states would likely disagree that CPCs are not practicing 
medicine. In a bit of a taunt, NIFLA’s attorney granted that “[i]t’s illegal to 
pretend to practice medicine without a license,” so “[i]f that’s what’s going on 
here, surely California would have found a way to [prosecute CPCs] before 
now.”198 Of course, this is a different remedy, with different applicable standards 
and constitutional review, but it is something California, and other states, could 
and should do. 
Every state prohibits the unauthorized practice of medicine, and then defines 
what constitutes the “practice of medicine” for that state.199 New York has a 
representative law, which defines the practice of medicine as “diagnosing, 
treating, operating or prescribing for any human disease, pain, injury, deformity 
or physical condition.”200 In some states, like Ohio, “holding out of one’s self as 
being engaged in the practice of medicine shall be regarded as practicing the 
same,”201 such that advertising or claiming to the public “to be a practitioner of 
medicine and surgery, or any of its branches”202 would be a violation. Thus, 
CPCs’ diagnostic reproductive services and counseling would violate Ohio’s 
statute. Of course, the state licensing board and local prosecutors would have to 
decide that they wanted to bring such a claim, as there is not a private right of 
action. This requires the political will of elected officials. But enforcing these 
                                                            
 198.  Oral Argument at 17:45, Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 
(2018) (No. 16-1140), https://www.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-1140 [https://perma.cc/4HRK-9JQQ]. 
 199.  In the mid 1970s, several state courts upheld convictions of acupuncture practitioners for the 
unauthorized practice of medicine, as the insertion of needles was considered minor surgery and the use 
of needles to reduce pain constituted the practice of medicine. See People v. Amber, 349 N.Y.S.2d 604 
(Sup. Ct. 1973); State v. Won, 528 P.2d 594 (Or. Ct. App. 1974); State v. Wilson, 528 P.2d 279 (Wash. 
Ct. App. 1974). A Washington state court easily found that acupuncturists practiced medicine under the 
plain language of the statute, as they “offer services to people with various afflictions and tell them they 
can help them feel better.” See State v. Pac. Health Ctr., Inc., 143 P.3d 618, 626 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006). 
Chiropractors have also been prosecuted for failing to comply with state licensing regulations when their 
practice exceeded the scope of their permit or they used the title “physician” or “doctor,” which implied 
graduation from an allopathic, accredited medical school. See State v. Rich, 339 N.E.2d 630, 632 (Ohio 
1975). 
 200.  N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6521 (McKinney 2018). 
 201.  State v. Farrand, 120 N.E.2d 469, 470 (Ohio Ct. App. 1952). 
 202.  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4731.41 (West 2018). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3345301
2018] Crisis at the Pregnancy Center: Regulating Pseudo-Clinics 45 
statutes does not pose any First Amendment challenges. Even an extremely 
conservative and anti-regulation Supreme Court would struggle to wiggle out 
from established precedent that permits this kind of regulation. 
In 1889, in Dent v. West Virginia,203 the Supreme Court upheld a West 
Virginia statute that made it a misdemeanor to practice, or attempt to practice, 
medicine without being qualified or a graduate of a reputable medical college.204 
The punishment for each offense could include a $5,000 fine, or 12-months 
imprisonment in the county jail.205 The prohibition on practicing medicine 
without a proper degree or license was considered by the Supreme Court to be 
within the state’s power to protect its citizens from the “consequences of 
ignorance and incapacity, as well as of deception and fraud.”206 Medical 
licensing laws have also survived most constitutional challenges, specifically 
claims of unconstitutional limitation of the free exercise of religion207 and 
violations of due process.208 There are limits on regulation of the medical 
profession.209 However, requiring medical licensure for clinics engaged in 
medical services would almost certainly be upheld. The key, of course, would be 
in making the threshold determination that CPCs are practicing medicine without 
a license. 
The penalties imposed for violating modern regulations vary from state to 
state.210 In California,211 any person who practices “any system or mode of 
treating the sick or afflicted” or who “diagnoses, treats, operates for, or 
prescribes for any ailment, blemish, deformity, disease, disfigurement, disorder, 
injury, or other physical or mental condition of any person” without a required 
certificate may be liable for a fine of up to $10,000, imprisonment for a period 
of up to one year, or both. In New Hampshire,212 on the other hand, violations 
may be penalized by receiving a cease and desist order or a fine of up to 
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$50,000.213 In Utah, practicing medicine without a license would generate a 
meager civil money penalty of not more than $5,000,214 which again reflects the 
weak political will of the state in enforcing these practices. Some of these fines 
are modest enough that they might be easy for the CPCs to pay. Alternatively, 
the state could pursue imprisonment in some states, like California, but this is 
politically very unpopular and therefore quite unlikely. Given the type of 
remedies involved, it is unsurprising that California has not yet chosen to 
prosecute CPCs for the unlawful practice of medicine. The action is not likely to 
yield meaningful consumer protection where CPCs can merely pay the fine or 
obtain a medical license and continue to mislead. 
Unlicensed CPCs may run afoul of the medical licensing laws of the state, 
as the diagnosis of pregnancy, the discussion of prenatal care, and the use of 
ultrasound imaging will easily constitute the practice of medicine.215 While 
CPCs might employ volunteer nurses and physicians, they would need to be 
licensed and in good standing in each state, and the facility itself would need to 
be licensed as a medical facility. 
B. New York Investigates CPCs for the Unauthorized Practice of Medicine 
In May of 2013, the Attorney General of New York issued a subpoena on 
Evergreen Association, which operates twelve CPCs in the New York City area. 
The purpose of the investigatory subpoena was to determine whether the CPCs 
were engaged in the unauthorized practice of medicine. A series of public 
hearings conducted in 2010 and 2011 by the New York City Council found that 
Evergreen “engaged in conduct which could constitute the unauthorized practice 
of medicine, including evaluating fetal health and requesting the medical history 
of clients.”216 Meanwhile, a televised news segment reported that “Evergreen 
made diagnoses of gestational age and situated its centers in medical buildings 
making them appear like medical offices.”217 The subpoena was meant to 
uncover whether the CPCs should be fined, as they did not appear to have any 
licensed medical staff. 
Evergreen attempted to quash the subpoena as a politically motivated attack 
on their constitutional right to advocate against abortion. It claimed that the 
Attorney General lacked a factual basis for issuing the subpoena. In June 2017, 
the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York found that the 
Attorney General had “amply demonstrate[d]” that a “legitimate factual basis 
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existed for the Attorney General to conduct his investigation and issue the 
subpoena to determine whether Evergreen is engaged in the unauthorized 
practice of medicine,” as he had adduced evidence “that Evergreen’s centers 
were set up to look like medical offices, staff members were dressed in scrubs or 
lab coats, a medical history was taken from clients, diagnoses of pregnancies, 
ectopic pregnancies, and gestational age were made, and medical advice was 
given, including false advice.”218 
The investigation could proceed, but, because Evergreen is a CPC with 
ideological roots, the court had to make sure the organization’s freedom of 
speech and association were not unduly chilled. Therefore, the court limited the 
scope of the document requests to ensure they were narrowly tailored to target 
only Evergreen’s provision of medically-related services.219 The Attorney 
General could not request documents about the overarching corporate structure 
or funding of Evergreen Association, unless those individuals were related to the 
provision of medical care. 
The investigation by the Attorney General of New York is a step in the right 
direction to protect the health of the women of New York. Given that many CPCs 
provide confirmation of pregnancy and gestational age of the fetus and offer 
prenatal vitamins, ultrasounds, and counseling on sexually transmitted 
diseases,220 it is alarming that some continue to do this without having medically 
licensed staff. There is great potential for substandard care and resulting harm, 
as women delay seeing licensed clinicians. These are the precise kinds of risks 
the state medical licensing statutes were drafted to address. 
V. REGULATING CPCS BY CHALLENGING THE USE OF FDA-APPROVED 
DEVICES IN UNAPPROVED WAYS 
A. The Co-Opting of the Ultrasound Device 
In theory, FDA enforcement could also provide a means for curbing CPCs’ 
deceptive practices. One of the chief ways that CPCs deceive pregnant women 
is by advertising that they provide free ultrasounds. This is a major selling point, 
especially for low-income women who seek their services. And given that the 
biggest risk factor in failing to receive adequate prenatal care is poverty and lack 
of insurance, this was precisely why California passed the FACT Act, requiring 
disclosure of California’s state-funded pregnancy treatment options.221 
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Recognizing that their niche market was the underinsured, a CPC trainer advised 
trainees to tell callers asking about abortion care that, while the CPC does not 
offer abortion services, it does provide free ultrasounds that the woman will need 
to have before she can get abortion care.222 From the pro-life perspective, 
providing a guided ultrasound is “crucial to the explicit task of persuading the 
woman not to abort.”223 The idea is based in part on an unproven premise that 
women who abort their fetuses are doing so thoughtlessly. Once the woman sees, 
via ultrasound, the heartbeat and perhaps the head, fingers, and toes of her fetus, 
she will be forced to emotionally confront the life she is about to terminate and 
will change her mind. 
Pro-life advocates have relied heavily on the persuasive power of the 
ultrasound. Twenty-six states have enacted some form of legislation that requires 
a woman to obtain an ultrasound before terminating her pregnancy. Similar bills 
have been introduced in many other states.224 In Kentucky, Louisiana, Texas, 
and Wisconsin, state law requires that the abortion provider show the woman the 
image on the ultrasound and describe it to her, even if she does not want to see 
it.225 North Carolina passed a law that required physicians performing abortions 
to display and describe the image during the ultrasound, even if the woman 
actively “avert[s] her eyes” and “refus[es] to hear.”226 This “real-time view” 
aspect of the law was challenged by physicians as compelled speech that violated 
their First Amendment rights (and professional ethics). The Fourth Circuit 
agreed that the “real-time view” part of the statute did not survive intermediate 
scrutiny.227 It was critical to the Court’s holding that the North Carolina law not 
allow physicians to deviate from the required disclosures or timing, even if, in 
the physician’s professional judgment, she thought it was best to do so. Doctors 
in Kentucky are likewise challenging their state’s informed consent to abortion 
statute on similar First Amendment grounds.228 It will be interesting to see what 
level of scrutiny the federal courts apply, in light of NIFLA and the Court’s 
dismissal of intermediate review for professional speech. Either way, state 
informed-consent laws that provide for the physician to deviate from the content 
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of the required disclosure and timing if it is in her best medical judgment to do 
so, seem much more likely to be upheld.229 Given that ultrasound is becoming a 
prerequisite to obtaining an abortion, it is necessary to see what the FDA has to 
say about its use in nonclinical settings, such as CPCs. 
B. Ultrasounds are FDA-Approved Devices that Should Not Be Used in 
Pseudo-Clinical Ways 
Ultrasound is a medical technology that is regulated by the FDA. Ultrasound 
provides a window into the anatomy of a fetus in utero, by sending sound waves 
through soft tissue such as the pregnant belly. The sound waves bounce off the 
tissue and render images of the size and structure of these organs and tissues, 
including any abnormalities in fetal development.230 Ultrasound has become a 
very important tool in obstetrics to confirm pregnancy, diagnose ectopic and 
molar pregnancies, and reveal fetal disfigurement, fetal movements, and uterine 
cysts or other abnormalities.231 Modern ultrasound technology employs higher 
frequency sound waves that can show a moving 3-D image of the wiggling fetus. 
While the technology is generally considered safe, prolonged non-clinical 
exposure may have negative health effects.232 Ultrasound waves can heat the 
tissues and produce small pockets of gas in body fluids or tissues.233 The long-
term consequences of these effects are still unknown.234 Out of concern for the 
negative health effects on the fetus, organizations such as the American Institute 
of Ultrasound in Medicine have advocated for “prudent use” of ultrasound during 
pregnancy, and have discouraged it from being used off-label. In addition to the 
biological effects of ultrasound on the pregnant woman and fetus, there are also 
health risks from inadequately trained staff or poorly maintained equipment.235 
Even with the 3-D advancements, ultrasound images require skill to be 
interpreted correctly and meaningfully. This is especially true in early 
pregnancy, when capturing the correct angles is difficult and the rendered images 
may be quite ambiguous to the untrained eye. Given the skill required to capture 
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and interpret the images, it is shocking that many CPCs lack trained or licensed 
radiological technicians. The lack of training of CPC staff can harm pregnant 
women and their fetuses. 
The most obvious potential harm is that women assume, incorrectly, that 
their babies are healthy after having the ultrasound performed. This risk was first 
identified when “keepsake ultrasound” studios such as Fetal Fotos opened in 
malls around the country. Women assumed the photographer would tell them if 
they saw something abnormal in the image.236 However, some photographers 
boldly announced that “they will ignore fetal abnormalities even if a fetus has 
three legs.”237 
In one instance, a woman went to a keepsake imaging studio and left 
believing her baby was healthy. She later discovered at her OB/GYN clinic that 
her baby had significant fetal anomalies that were consistent with Trisomy 18 
and Smith-Lemli-Opitz Syndrome. These abnormalities were visible earlier, but 
went undetected or unreported by the operator at the fetal keepsake studio.238 
Ignoring these defects and not reporting them seems cruel, until you realize that 
the photographers are probably not very experienced in reading these images and 
are also trying to insulate themselves from claims of medical malpractice or the 
unauthorized practice of medicine. There are many instances of clinicians being 
sued for medical malpractice over improper capture or interpretation of 
ultrasound images.239 Whatever line remains between keepsake studios and 
clinical practice must be defended by these businesses. 
If the keepsake imaging studio were held to a medical standard of care, it 
could be liable for negligence for failure to report significant clinical findings. 
However, given that these entities are purely commercial and make no claims 
about diagnosing disorders, the consumers are poorly protected from the false 
sense of security they receive. There is significant risk of psychological injury, 
as well as the potential to neglect more rigorous clinical follow-up if they assume 
the fetus is healthy. Unfortunately, we will probably never know the extent of 
the harm done by these keepsake ultrasound studios, as they are unlikely to report 
their findings to any public health agencies.240 
While the practices at keepsake ultrasound studios are troubling, the risk that 
the consumer will misinterpret the nature of the ultrasound is much more 
profound at a pseudo-clinic, such as a CPC. If you are visiting a strip mall and 
realize you are paying for a “fun” and “novel” ultrasound experience in an 
obviously non-clinical setting, your expectations differ significantly from the 
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expectations of women entering a CPC. As discussed previously, CPCs 
deliberately mislead women into thinking they are seeing a nurse or doctor at a 
proper health clinic. Given the heightened risk of misperception, it is much less 
ethical for CPCs to employ ideological and unlicensed staff to interpret 
ultrasound images. 
C. States and the FDA Could Prohibit the Use of Ultrasound by Unlicensed 
CPCs 
Louisiana has attempted to eliminate off-label, non-clinical ultrasound 
screening by defining them as an unauthorized practice of medicine under 
Louisiana law.241 California already protects somewhat against the use of 
ultrasound technology for non-approved uses. In 2009, the California legislature 
passed a bill that requires certain disclosures before ultrasound is used for non-
clinical purposes. Specifically, the consumer must be told “that the FDA has 
determined the use of medical ultrasound equipment for reasons other than 
medical purposes or without a physician’s prescription is an unapproved use of 
medical technology.”242 Unfortunately, despite their ability to do so, state and 
federal regulatory agencies have not enforced any actions against keepsake 
ultrasound studios or CPCs based on their provision of ultrasounds.243 
FDA discourages the use of ultrasound in a non-clinical setting by those who 
are not trained in its use or interpretation. While off-label uses of devices may 
be allowed under the supervision of a physician and within tight statutory 
conditions, the use by non-clinicians such as unlicensed CPCs or keepsake 
studios is clearly an unapproved off-label use.244 In addition to regulating how 
the device may be used, the FDA has also deemed the promotion of unapproved 
uses of a device to be a violation of FDA regulations, and the training of CPC 
staff for an unapproved use would be “illegal promotional activity.”245 FDA 
could require that CPCs employ trained ultrasound technicians and comply with 
clinical guidelines. Ultimately, the FDA has the authority to shut keepsake-
imaging studios down. However, given the limited resources available for 
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enforcement at the FDA, senior agency officials appear to have opted to focus 
their attention on more high-risk devices.246 
CONCLUSION: RECLAIMING INFORMED CONSENT IN THE ABORTION CONTEXT 
By suggesting that women bring battery causes of action against unlicensed 
CPCs, this Article advocates for returning informed consent law to its ethical and 
legal roots. Informed consent doctrine surrounding abortion has been perverted 
by state TRAP laws, which have blurred the lines between ideology and 
medicine. The majority opinion in NIFLA exacerbates this troubling trend. When 
physicians are required to share misinformation with their patients seeking 
abortion, or when CPCs exploit the medical model, this does violence to the 
sanctity of the physician-patient relationship.247 It erodes trust and sullies the 
professional reputation of all physicians. Even where abortion providers follow 
up the mandatory disclosures with disclaimers that “I only shared that 
information because I have to by law, not because I believe it,” there is still 
confusion. Does the physician speak for the government, or can she be trusted to 
protect her patients’ best interests? What does it mean if the physician is telling 
the patient things that she herself does not believe? Is anything objective in 
medicine, or is it all up for debate? 
CPCs are exploiting the professional respect of physicians and the existing 
framework of informed consent to shoehorn ideology through medicine. 
Through TRAP laws and the deceptive practices of CPCs, the pro-life 
community is eroding the distinction between a clinic and a pseudo-clinic, and 
between politics and patient care. This could have sweeping negative impacts on 
the practice of medicine, and also on women’s health. Women who visit CPCs 
may delay being seen by actual doctors and might assume incorrectly that the 
CPC staff are held to a professional standard of care. This could impose 
significant health risks both on the pregnant woman and the fetus. 
In the context of physician-assisted suicide, the Supreme Court has 
recognized that states have an interest in protecting the integrity and ethics of the 
medical profession.248 This should also be true in the context of abortion 
providers. Recall that the Casey plurality stated that “the doctor-patient relation 
here is entitled to the same solicitude it receives in other contexts.”249 This 
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message has sadly been lost on many state legislators, eager to pass TRAP laws 
that pervert the ethical principles of patient autonomy, beneficence, non-
maleficence, and justice. Physicians should be allowed to have political voices. 
So, too, should pro-life activists. But each should have their policy debates, and 
win or lose them, in the political sphere. The sacred relationship between the 
physician and patient should not be leveraged for ideological gains. 
At present, the law is lopsided. The First Amendment protects the CPCs’ 
deceptive practices not in spite of but because they are pseudo-clinics, motivated 
not by commercial or professional interest but by ideology. Indeed, an auto-
mechanic or plumber, and certainly a licensed health care facility, is legally 
prohibited from deceiving customers in the way that the CPCs do. And yet 
precisely because the clinic is not a clinic at all, its deceptive practices are 
afforded the greatest possible protection as ideological free speech. This is an 
absurd outcome, given how underhanded CPCs are about revealing their 
ideological underpinnings. 
To correct this imbalance, it would have been wise for the Supreme Court 
to adopt the perspective of the objective listener of the compelled disclosures 
when determining how to classify CPCs’ speech. This would have been a better 
way to balance the free speech rights of organizations against the public’s need 
to understand who exactly is speaking to them. Political organizations such as 
CPCs should not be allowed to hide behind their ideology to deceive 
unsuspecting individuals. Unfortunately, at present this is not a practical 
solution. It is not reasonable to expect injured women to wait until the Supreme 
Court revisits or overrules its NIFLA precedent. 
There are already tools at the disposal of our prosecutors and agency 
regulators which can help to provide some protection for pregnant women. 
Consumer protection statutes could restrict the deceptive advertising practices of 
CPCs. State laws prohibiting the unauthorized practice of medicine could be 
enforced, as New York’s attorney general is attempting to do. FDA enforcement 
actions could chip away at the CPC’s use of FDA-approved medical devices in 
non-approved ways. But each of these existing tools requires the political will of 
elected and appointed officials. And so far, there are very few of these leaders 
who are willing to spend the political capital to protect pregnant women from 
deceptive CPCs. This has left the injured pregnant women with very little 
recourse. 
Following basic tort remedies of compensatory damages, these injured 
pregnant women should be compensated for their pain and suffering, any 
resulting lost wages or income, and any other reasonable financial damages that 
stem from the battery, such as increased medical expenses from delayed 
diagnosis of pregnancy complications, or even wrongful death if the CPC’s 
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conduct results in the unwanted death of the fetus.250 Additionally, where the 
CPCs deliberately defrauded these women to gain access to their bodies, these 
women would also be good candidates for punitive damages, which would help 
to fund the litigation and attorney’s fees. 
We must fight to reclaim informed consent. It is not a meaningless tool to 
shoehorn ideology through. It is not an amorphous concept, which allows a 
pseudo-clinic to make a woman think she is being treated medically, when she 
is actually being persuaded to submit to a religious ideology. By returning to the 
roots of the informed consent doctrine, suing for the intentional tort of battery, 
victims of the misleading practice of CPCs can obtain personal redress. In the 
absence of proper public enforcement, tort law emerges as our last and best 
resort. And while tort law is scattershot and ex post, it can nonetheless provide 
meaningful and necessary regulation of CPCs’ deceptive behavior. 
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